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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The Search for the Whole 
 
 
 
 
 The encounter of these two concepts, “catholicity” and “university,” is deeply 
significant, but not in the first instance on account of any possible synthesis that may be forged 
from them. The significance lies rather at a deeper level in the implicit point of reference that 
they share. Catholicity means an orientation to the whole, deriving ultimately from the Greek 
κατά (according to) and ὅλος (the whole). University, which has its origins in the Latin 
universitas, similarly refers to the totality—that which, like the universe, encompasses all things 
in one complete turn (uni + versus). While arising in distinct cultural-linguistic contexts, the two 
concepts thus manifest a shared concern for the maximal dimension, for the framework in which 
individual parts all find their place. In our day, this connotation of comprehensiveness has been 
obscured perhaps by the fact that the two words are so closely associated with particular 
institutions, the very particularity of which seems to negate any claim to universality. The 
Catholic Church does not encompass even the whole body of Christian faithful, let alone all of 
humanity; and no two universities share even so much as the same curriculum, to say nothing of 
agreement among researchers about what common horizon unites all their diverse enquiries. But 
these facts merely put the question all the more insistently: where then is a definitive whole to be 
found? In what does it consist? 
 The problem of the whole and its parts, the one and the many, is a foundational one, 
arguably the most basic and abiding question for human reflection. Before it could arise as a 
theoretical matter in the various philosophies of the ancient world, it had already acquired 
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burning exigency as a practical matter. What was to be the social unit with the fullest claim to 
sovereignty, and how could one reconcile that arrangement with the existence of other peoples 
outside its confines? This political question was intimately bound up with the question of 
sovereignty over life itself, and thus of the gods, something evident above all in the history of 
Israel. Emerging from the cultural context of the Ancient Near East in which each people had its 
own god, the Hebrews come to understand, ultimately through the catastrophic experience of 
exile, that not only Israel but also the entire “earth is Yahweh’s and the fullness thereof, the 
world and those who dwell therein.” (Ps 24:1) Far from resolving the puzzle of pluralism, 
though, this insight merely intensifies it. If all the earth belonged to the God of Israel, then what 
did that mean for Israel’s place among the nations, which it understood to be distinct and 
particular? Without resolving the tension, Israel refers the matter entirely to the realm of divine 
freedom, to which the freedom of the people was in turn to correspond: “if you obey my voice 
and keep my covenant, you shall be my own possession among all peoples; for all the earth is 
mine, and you shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” (Ex 19:5; cf. Deut 7:6-11)  
 While Israel encounters the problem of pluralism in reflecting upon its history, thinkers in 
ancient Greece discover it in relation to nature and the cosmos. A simple observation forms the 
basis of the puzzle: the phenomenon of change. Not only is there a multiplicity of things in the 
world, these things are also constantly in flux, coming into and going out of existence. But 
something does not come from nothing. What then is the whole of which all these many things 
are a part and which accounts for all the variations in which they appear? The sheer number and 
range of theories that this puzzle elicited is evidence not only of the endless ingenuity of the 
Greek mind but also of the objective difficulty of solving the problem. The earliest approaches 
attempt to do away with the problem altogether by calling into question the apparent polarity 
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between whole and part, resolving the tension in favor of either one or the other. Thus 
Parmenides will say that all the multiplicity of the world is a mere illusion and that the whole of 
being is but one thing that does not change. Heraclitus takes the opposite tack, claiming that 
there is no whole but only fragments, with everything in a perpetual state of becoming. Only 
with Plato does it become possible to see how multiplicity might be consistent with the unity of 
all things in a way that preserves the reality of both. But even for Plato and the long line of 
thinkers descending from him, the tension is finally resolved in favor of the One, the discovery 
of which prompts us to leave the world of multiplicity behind, preferring infinite and 
unconditioned being to its many finite images.  
As the search for the whole continues outside of Greece in the post-classical world, so 
does the tendency to collapse the whole-part polarity in favor of one side or the other. In the last, 
Promethean attempt at a synthesis of all things, Hegel will be able to say, “The True is the 
whole,”1 and to identify that whole with “Absolute Knowing.”2 The phenomenal world of finite 
being is merely the forum in which absolute Spirit unfolds its infinite dimensions dialectically, 
culminating in the state in which “Spirit…knows itself as Spirit”3 precisely by means of the 
finite beings themselves: “it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the 
form of pure knowledge.”4 In the wake of Hegel, Marx will preserve the dynamic element of 
dialectic while detaching it from any supposed operation of absolute Spirit, anticipating and 
fueling the materialist bent of succeeding ages. With this, the pendulum shifts back once again to 
finite being and thus to the part.  
                                               
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
11. 
2 Hegel, 493. 
3 Hegel, 493. 
4 Hegel, 409. 
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 So brief and rapid a review, ranging over three thousand years, is obviously not intended 
as anything like a statement of the status quaestionis. The point is merely to form, on the basis of 
some representative approaches, an initial sense for the question itself and its enduring character 
as a puzzle of first importance for human reflection across ages and cultures. What indeed is the 
whole that makes sense of all the various fragments of human life: the tribes and tongues, 
peoples and nations, nature in all its kaleidoscopic diversity, time itself and its endless succession 
of moments? Is there such a thing, or are the fragments the final word? In one form or another, 
this is the question that occupied the Hebrew psalmist and scribe, the Greek lover of wisdom, the 
German professor and the revolutionary. It is also our own. But it is not, of course, our only 
question. Like all things in the realm of finite being, even this most fundamental of puzzles exists 
in a whole-part dynamic: though it itself concerns the whole, any number of other questions also 
occur to us as we survey the world around us, questions concerning all its many parts. Serious 
reflection on such questions has taken place in an enormous range of settings, as even the small 
sample of figures named above makes clear, from the precincts of a place of worship to the 
public spaces of a city and, only much later, the lecture hall and scholar’s office. This last 
setting, however, has taken on special significance because of the lasting institutional form it has 
given to what seems, for all the world, to be an inexhaustible activity of enquiring into all that 
exists.  
One need not romanticize the historical origins of the university to see that this was its 
fundamental orientation from the beginning even in spite of significant indications to the 
contrary. Two of the three major disciplines in the earliest universities, law and medicine, were 
of an eminently practical, not speculative, nature and thus quite limited in scope. And the 
formation of the institution itself was rooted in practical necessity, especially in Bologna where 
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the initiative lay entirely on the side of students, who sought to organize the studies they needed 
to complete in order to practice a profession. Even in Paris, where the speculative discipline of 
theology reigned supreme and where scholars took the lead in organizing the course of studies, 
narrow questions of practicality played an important role in the decision to found the institution. 
Thus the totality to which universitas originally referred was the sum total of masters and 
students, universitas magistrorum et scholarium, the kind of unit that could act for a common 
purpose, not unlike any other medieval guild.5 Nevertheless, in no small part because of 
theology’s open horizon, the institution was in principle ordered to the totality of being in a quite 
unlimited way. This was because of the members’ confidence in the intelligibility of all that 
exists. In the Summa, Thomas was to articulate what became the classic formulation of the 
principle: “everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable.”6 Being and truth are 
convertible.  
 In some ways, the university’s orientation to the study of being in all its many forms is 
even more evident eight-hundred years later. If the medieval and pre-modern university typically 
consisted of only a handful of closely-related faculties, the list of academic departments in the 
modern university is large and still growing. Even such departments frequently function more 
like umbrellas for specialized institutes, research centers, and a wide range of individual projects 
which are highly differentiated even from each other as scholars work in ever more precisely 
defined sub-fields. While the exploration of a wide variety of questions is in fundamental 
                                               
5 See generally Stephen C. Ferruolo, The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their 
Critics, 1100-1215 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the 
Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Charles Homer Haskins, The 
Rise of Universities (New York: Holt and Company, 1923); Ian P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval 
Paris: Theologians and the University, c.1100-1330 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: 
Christian Classics, 1981), Ia, q. 16, a. 3, co. 
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continuity with the origins of the university, this relatively recent proliferation of disciplines and 
subdisciplines traces its roots to a very particular development: the discovery of positivistic 
research methods. Honed in study of the natural sciences, the positivistic approach emphasizes 
the testing of falsifiable hypotheses. It is a straightforward method and a powerful one, giving 
ample proof of its utility by virtue of its ability to produce objectively verifiable knowledge. 
What’s more, it can be applied widely, opening up new avenues of knowledge not only in the 
natural and social sciences but also in those humanistic fields historically associated much more 
closely with the exercise of subjectivity: art and music, history and literature, even philosophy 
and theology. It was the embrace of this method as the gold standard of academic enquiry that 
gave rise to a new model of the university, first of all in nineteenth-century Germany and then 
spreading from there to the United States and the United Kingdom. In short order the German 
research model conquered the entire world, and its dominance continues to this day. As a result, 
we now know more than ever before about more subjects, and the results of these investigations 
merely suggest further avenues of exploration. 
 Perhaps never before, however, have we had so great a sense of the profound pluralism of 
the world either. And thus the question returns once again: is there anything that integrates all the 
many fragments of existence, which only seem more numerous the more refined our knowledge 
becomes? What is finally at stake in this question is nothing less than the integration and 
wholeness of the human person herself, who is simultaneously conscious of having a real 
internal unity and yet also of being but a single part of a much larger reality. How is she to make 
sense of that reality, of the interrelation of its parts, and of her own place within it? So 
foundational a question inevitably arises in one form or another for all those who stop to reflect 
on their lives in whatever particular social context they may inhabit. But the context of the 
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university proves uniquely well-suited both to surfacing the question in an explicit way and to 
reflecting on the set of possible answers. In the face of the large and ever growing deposit of 
human knowledge, the university must decide how to introduce students to it. What is the 
framework in which such studies may fruitfully proceed? What fundamental points of orientation 
do students need in order to make sense of the great mass of phenomena in the world? In 
articulating a course of studies, the university inevitably indicates its approach to the question of 
the fragments. Here again, therefore, practical necessity can be put to the service of a more 
universal end. The answer that the university gives in the form of its undergraduate program 
makes for an eminently useful heuristic for understanding a fundamental problem whose 
significance extends well beyond the context of education. 
 Given the prevailing influence of positivism in the modern university, it is perhaps no 
surprise that curricula in the past century and a half have almost uniformly moved in the 
direction of eliminating master frameworks altogether. For such frameworks are precisely what 
positivistic methods are least suited to address. If some whole actually exists as a meaningful 
reality, it would not seem to be susceptible to description by means of the same methods suited 
to the study of finite being, namely observation and the testing of falsifiable hypotheses. At the 
same time, however, the sensible world presents so much to the reason that is capable of being 
scrutinized by this method that the loss can go largely unnoticed, at least at first. As a result, the 
curriculum in mainstream American universities now consists of three standard elements which 
are ordered to depth and breadth but not synthesis. The real core of the program is the major or 
concentration, which facilitates the development of expertise in a specific field. What is typically 
called the “core” curriculum, on the other hand, is in practice a preliminary set of general 
education courses taken mostly in the first two years and aimed at providing exposure to a wide 
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variety of fields and competencies. Finally, a certain number of courses are left entirely to the 
student to select. That there is thus an explicitly “elective” part of the curriculum obscures the 
fact that the choice of courses in much of the rest of the curriculum, especially in the so-called 
core, is also left to the student’s discretion operating within broad parameters. If there is to be 
any effort at synthesis, therefore, and not merely the exploration of various fragments whether in 
depth or en masse, it falls entirely to the individual student to perform. But this also implies that, 
from the perspective of the university as a whole, synthesis in the fullest sense is not strictly 
speaking possible. For the individual is herself merely a part, and thus a personal synthesis can 
never amount to anything more than a partial reality itself, limited as it is to the confines of the 
individual who effects it. 
 That this state of affairs has not elicited more than a few expressions of concern is 
perhaps indicative of a broadly shared sense in our day that one cannot speak meaningfully of a 
whole, but only of parts.7 In every place where one might expect to find a whole, what appears 
instead are seemingly irreconcilable fragments. Within the body politic, for example, the place of 
unity is evidently not the nation but the parties, which endlessly vie with each other for control of 
the machinery of government to implement their agenda. But even the most superficial scrutiny 
                                               
7 Prominent examples of such critiques include: Andrew Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should 
Be (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: 
Limited Learning on College Campuses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Stratford 
Caldecott and Ken Myers, Beauty for Truth’s Sake: On the Re-Enchantment of Education (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Brazos Press, 2017); Stefan Collini, What Are Universities For? (New York: Penguin, 2012); 
William Egginton, The Splintering of the American Mind: Identity Politics, Inequality, and Community on 
Today’s College Campuses (New York: Bloomsbury, 2018); Stanley Hauerwas, The State of the 
University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007); Anthony 
T. Kronman, Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given up on the Meaning of Life 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Harry Lewis, Excellence Without a Soul: Does Liberal 
Education Have a Future? (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007); Mark Edmundson, Why Teach?: In Defense 
of a Real Education (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Warren Treadgold, The University We Need: 
Reforming American Higher Education (New York: Encounter Books, 2018); William Deresiewicz, 
Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life (New York: 
Free Press, 2014). 
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of the parties reveals profound internal divisions. And in any case, even the various wings of the 
parties are not the last word. In the liberal democratic order, the self-determining individual 
constitutes the fundamental unit of society. With this, we arrive back at the personal synthesis as 
the unique place in which any potential whole is to be sought—something which essentially, and 
not merely accidentally, it is incapable of constituting. For proof of the inherent defect of the 
personal synthesis, one need not have reference to the radical doubts raised in some recent 
genetics research about the real unity of the individual.8 Any supposed whole that I seek to 
assemble for myself will necessarily be reducible to my own limitations. 
 It is only in this context that the utter peculiarity of catholicity, one of the two concepts 
with which we began, can at last come into view. For as our ability to analyze finite being has 
increased, our expectation of finding a meaningful whole has narrowed to the point that the only 
remaining place in which to seek it is one in which it cannot appear. Even so, the existence of 
such a whole is precisely what is at stake in the attribution of catholicity to the Christian Church, 
an attribution which has not been abandoned in the face of modernity but resolutely maintained. 
We can leave to one side for the moment the second-order question of the truth of the claim. 
What is breathtaking in our age is that any institution, or finite being of any sort, should claim to 
have a definitive relation to the whole. But this is just what is claimed on behalf of the Church, 
even from the earliest decades of its existence. We must hasten to add, as Avery Dulles is careful 
to point out, that catholicity is predicated of the Church in a variety of ways in the patristic 
period, including five that Cyril of Jerusalem identifies in his fourth-century Catechetical 
Lectures: “it extends to the ends of the earth; it teaches all the doctrine needed for salvation; it 
                                               
8 For a popular treatment of the research, which suggests that the individual organism itself can be 
understood as a site of competition between strands of DNA known as allele lines, see: Richard Dawkins, 
The Selfish Gene, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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brings every sort of human being under obedience; it cures every kind of sin; and it possesses 
every form of virtue.”9 But in viewing the concept from this variety of angles according to its 
different modes of application, we ought not lose sight of the central conception common to 
them all, which is the property of fullness. It is this notion of fullness that Wolfgang Beinert 
finds to be the governing connotation of catholicity in the theology of Ignatius of Antioch, in 
whose first century Letter to the Smyrneans the term first appears in the historical record. 10 
According to Ignatius, says Beinert, “the Church is catholic because, and insofar as, she is the 
representation and communication of the plenitude and perfection of Jesus Christ. To call the 
Church ‘catholic’, then, is to say that she is all-encompassing, endowed with all plenitude, 
perfect.”11 
 Can such a claim still be understood in our age, much less accepted? In the past two 
centuries, the whole-part polarity has been resolved so decisively in favor of the part that all talk 
of a whole has been sidelined, if not indeed neutralized altogether by relegating it to the sphere 
of the private and personal. To affirm that the Church is catholic, however, is to say that the 
fragmentariness of existence is not the fundamental reality, but that there is in fact a whole of 
which plenitude and perfection may be predicated in a definitive way. It only adds to the 
obscurity of this claim that the whole to which it refers is not the Church itself. Rather, the 
Church is oriented to the whole (κατά + ὅλος), and for this reason participates in its fullness, 
while the whole itself lies beyond it. And this indeed is the meaning—and paradox—of the 
                                               
9 Avery Dulles, The Catholicity of the Church (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 14. 
10 Andrew Louth, ed., Early Christian Writings: The Apostolic Fathers, trans. Maxwell Staniforth (New 
York: Penguin Classics, 1987), 105. 
11 Quoted in Hans Urs von Balthasar, “The Absoluteness of Christianity and the Catholicity of the 
Church,” in Man Is Created, trans. Adrian Walker, vol. 5, Explorations in Theology (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1989), 415–16. 
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concept of catholicity: that, even in spite of the inherent disproportionality, the whole can appear 
precisely in the fragment when the fragment is oriented to it.  
  If, therefore, there is an answer to the puzzle of the whole that maintains the integrity of 
both the whole and the parts without dissolving either, catholicity would seem to be key to it. In 
precisely what does catholicity consist, though, and how does such an orientation to the whole 
bring mere fragments into relation to its fullness? We might expect that, of all things, Catholic 
universities should be in the best position to help us answer the question. For they stand at the 
very intersection of these two phenomena: the university’s fanning out in every direction to 
explore being in all its multiplicity and the Church’s living relation to the divine fullness in Jesus 
Christ. What we find, though, is that contemporary Catholic universities do not on the whole 
differ from their secular peers in any meaningful way. With respect to the crucial measure 
identified above, the undergraduate curriculum, the only element that differentiates Catholic 
from secular universities are the one or two required courses each in philosophy and theology 
that remain part of the core.12 But when one then surveys the long lists of course options that 
fulfill these requirements at various institutions, the reality begins to dawn: the university either 
cannot decide what specific aspects of philosophy and theology every student should be exposed 
to, refuses to make a definite choice for fear of imposing a framework on students, or does not 
actually know how philosophy or theology can serve to integrate the various phenomena 
encountered in the rest of the curriculum. Even in Catholic universities, then, the question of 
integration is remanded to the forum of the personal synthesis.  
 It does not bear dwelling for long on the contingent historical circumstances that have led 
to this convergence of Catholic and secular education. Already in 1962, the president of the 
                                               
12 See, for example, the core curriculum of Boston College: https://www.bc.edu/bc-
web/schools/mcas/undergraduate/core-curriculum/core-renewal.html 
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University of Notre Dame, Theodore Hesburgh, who would become one of the iconic figures in 
modern Catholic education, identified an important challenge to the realization of catholicity in 
the modern university. As he explained in an article in America magazine, “because everything 
in a pluralistic society tends to become homogenized, the Catholic university has the temptation 
to become like all other universities, with theology and philosophy attached to the academic 
body like a kind of vermiform appendix, a vestigial remnant, neither useful nor decorative, a 
relic of the past. If this happens, the Catholic university may indeed become a great university, 
but it will not be a Catholic university.”13 Five years later, Hesburgh famously convened a 
meeting of his peers from across the country at Land O’ Lakes, Wisconsin, to articulate together 
the mission and distinctive characteristics of the Catholic university. Despite the concern that he 
had expressed earlier, the example of ‘all other universities’ loomed large in the meeting, as the 
opening line of the joint statement indicates: “The Catholic University today must be a university 
in the full modern sense of the word.”14 The recognition that Catholic universities had become 
something of a backwater and lagged far behind the academic excellence of secular institutions 
made modernization the urgent priority.15 “With regard to the undergraduate,” the document 
states, “the university should endeavor to present a collegiate education that is truly geared to 
modern society.”16 In such a context, the subtle and difficult question of how to realize 
catholicity in the institution was bound to be overshadowed by the already enormous challenge 
of modernization. The generation of leaders gathered at Land O’ Lakes thus settled on a modest 
and more readily achievable vision of what makes for a Catholic university: the “presence of a 
                                               
13 Theodore M. Hesburgh, “Looking Back at Newman,” America 106 (March 3, 1962): 721. 
14 Neil G. McCluskey and Theodore M. Hesburgh, eds., The Catholic University: A Modern Appraisal 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), 336, §1. 
15 For more on the challenge of modernization, see Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic 
Higher Education in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
16 McCluskey and Hesburgh, The Catholic University, 339, §8. 
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group of scholars in all branches of theology”17 who can facilitate “discussion within the 
university community in which theology confronts all the rest of modern culture and all the areas 
of intellectual study which it includes.”18 On this view, the Catholic university merely “adds to 
the basic idea of a modern university” the presence of an actively engaged theology 
department.19 Lest the presence of such a department raise the specter of “theological or 
philosophical imperialism,” the statement is at pains to stress that its role is only to keep alive an 
“interdisciplinary discussion,” confident that “there will necessarily result…an awareness that 
there is a philosophical and theological dimension to most intellectual subjects when they are 
pursued far enough.”20 Rather, therefore, than seeing either theology or philosophy as the 
essential point of integration, theology and philosophy are themselves to be “integrated into” the 
kind of curriculum shared with all other modern universities.21 
 While this expedient solution enabled the survival of universities run by Catholic entities, 
it left unanswered the critical question of whether any real synthesis of catholicity and the 
university is possible and what form it might take if so. For it guaranteed that the search for the 
whole in Catholic-run universities would be relegated to the same private forum as in secular 
universities, which was bound to be partial and incomplete even if supplied with additional input 
from theology. But this means that the problem of the whole and the fragments remains a 
burning question for both Catholic and secular universities alike. And thus we can turn to 
critiques of the modern university in both contexts to aid our own search for the whole. What 
                                               
17 McCluskey and Hesburgh, 336, §2. 
18 McCluskey and Hesburgh, 337, §4. 
19 McCluskey and Hesburgh, 336, §1. 
20 McCluskey and Hesburgh, 337, §4. 
21 McCluskey and Hesburgh, 339, §8. 
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form must any such whole take if it is genuinely to gather up all things into one, and how can we 
come into relation to it? 
 Friederich Nietzsche was among the first in the modern age to identify the link between 
the operation of the university and this most fundamental of questions. In Chapter 1, we turn to 
his critique of the modern university to see what he can tell us about the relation between the 
whole and the parts. On his telling, the whole appears in the form of an all-encompassing cultural 
synthesis that results from works of genius. The university finds its integrity only in orienting all 
its teaching and research toward the cultivation of such genius, something which he argues the 
positivistic approach of the German research model undermines. His account thus emphasizes 
the action of the human will above all, which must undergo strict discipline in order to recognize 
and support the will of the genius to construct a whole from the fragments.  
But how can any such whole be constructed if not on account of a prior condition that 
makes it possible? With Alasdair MacIntyre, therefore, we turn in Chapter 2 to the order evident 
in the world, from which the Scottish philosopher thinks we can extrapolate the whole that 
makes sense of all the various fragments. The specialization that is characteristic of the modern 
university has tended to isolate the various disciplines from one another and to obscure their 
common foundations in a single order of all things. But the coherence of the university is 
intimately linked to our ability to perceive the coherence of the universe itself. Only a cosmology 
capable of revealing the relations between all things can supply that coherence, according to 
MacIntyre. His account thus emphasizes the human intellect as the mode by which we come into 
relation to the whole. 
 As much as they differ from each other, the accounts of Nietzsche and MacIntyre 
confront a common problem: that the human will and intellect are both finite. How can either of 
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them come into relation to the whole without reducing it to their own finite proportion? If the 
whole is to communicate itself to the finite being in its integrity, it must do so as the wholly other 
and according to a mode of receptivity. But this, says Hans Urs von Balthasar, is precisely what 
the aesthetic faculty makes possible. In Chapter 3, we turn with Balthasar to theological 
aesthetics, which is capable of perceiving in the incomparable figure of Jesus Christ the divine 
Son who receives his being from the Father at every moment, not only as man but also in the 
eternal act of his generation. In the Son’s disposition of pure receptivity, it becomes possible to 
see the fundamental unity of all things—even in the realm of creaturely being—in their 
proceeding from the Father as an ongoing gift. The only real fragmentation is that caused by sin, 
but by accepting even the Cross from the Father in an act of loving obedience, the Son suffers 
the contradictions of sin to the end and thus reconciles the fragments to one another and to the 
Father. Catholicity in its true and proper sense at last appears in the Son’s unlimited readiness to 
receive all things from the Father, even to the point of letting himself be formed and re-formed 
according to the exigencies of his mission. 
 Such a catholic readiness to be formed into whatever God should desire is also the first 
and final word of the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola. In that context, it appears as the 
highest possibility of the creature, but only as a response to the loving contemplation of the 
figure of the Son. Thus the dynamic that Balthasar would go on to articulate in an explicit way as 
theological aesthetics already constituted the foundational experience of Ignatius and the first 
Jesuits. It also formed the core intuition and real theological innovation of the early Jesuit 
apostolate, especially Jesuit education, which could venture untroubled into “all things” on 
account of its being anchored in an irreducible sense for the whole in prayer and contemplation. 
Chapter 4 reviews the evidence for this interpretation of Jesuit education, beginning with a key 
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letter from Peter Faber to the first Jesuits Ignatius sent to the University of Paris, which stresses 
the priority of “holy sensing” even beyond the sheer acquisition of knowledge. Cultivating such 
a disposition of catholicity remains the fullest realization of Catholic education and the definitive 
means by which to discern the whole even in the midst of fragments.
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Chapter 1 
 
 
The Whole Constructed from Fragments: 
 
Nietzsche, Culture, and the Will 
 
 
 
 
The first major work of Friedrich Nietzsche, a set of public lectures he delivered in the 
Spring of 1872, appeared once again in English translation only three years ago, after having 
been out of print for half a century.1 The event passed mostly unnoticed, eliciting only a few 
favorable book reviews but, as of yet, no serious scholarly engagement with the text.2 From 
Nietzsche’s perspective, of course, the relative obscurity of so difficult a text is just as well, since 
he did not produce it for the general public, but only for those few aristocratic souls able and 
willing to conceive a philosophy of the future. Whether or not we ourselves belong to that 
intended audience, these earliest lectures of Nietzsche are nevertheless a vital resource, 
representing as they do the first word of his philosophy. Of all people, philosophers are 
especially in the habit of choosing their words carefully, and all the more so their first word, 
knowing that they cannot take it back and that it inevitably reveals in some way the core of what 
they have to say. It is remarkable, then, that the philosopher who would go on to detonate a 
series of explosive critiques of late modernity meant to penetrate to its very foundations should 
                                               
1 The first English translation was published in 1909 and then reissued in 1964. Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Complete Works, ed. Oscar Levy, vol. 3, 9 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964). 
2 See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz, “‘Anti-Education’: What Nietzsche’s Critiques of Education Can Tell Us,” 
Commonweal, January 29, 2016, 27; John Gray, “Anti-Education by Friedrich Nietzsche,” The Guardian, 
January 8, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/08/anti-education-on-the-future-of-our-
educational-institutions-friedrich-nietzsche-review; Paul O’Mahoney, “Anti-Education,” International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 25, no. 5 (December 1, 2017): 744–48. 
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choose for his first sally the question of the “future of our educational institutions.”3 On the eve 
of the German research university’s rise to utter dominance, it was precisely that model, said 
Nietzsche, and the entire instructional apparatus built around it, that threatened true education 
and its integrating function in society. 
The essential lines of Nietzsche’s argument can be sketched out in a few quick strokes. 
Standing as a permanent monument across the ages, the staggering achievement of classical 
antiquity, and especially of Greece, reveals the highest possibility of human activity: a cultural 
synthesis produced by—and productive of—literary, artistic, and philosophical genius. Here was 
a culture ordered to the integral flourishing of every kind of human excellence. While it is 
characteristic of genius to appear effortless, the singularity of the Greek phenomenon in the long 
train of human history points to an underlying contest of wills at play in every age. Standing 
athwart the effort of noble souls to order society toward the achievement of greatness are those 
endowed with merely common talent who can, nevertheless, come to exercise uncommon 
influence. To these middling sorts, genius is not only unintelligible but represents a positive 
threat to the kind of society they seek, one which corresponds to the limits of their own 
mediocrity. Unable to construct the kind of genuine synthesis that culture represents, they must 
                                               
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-Education: On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, ed. Paul Reitter and 
Chad Wellmon, trans. Damion Searls (NYRB Classics, 2015). Prior to the publication of this work, of 
course, the application of Nietzsche’s philosophy to the realm of education was already the subject of 
extensive study in Anglophone literature. Representative studies include: Aharon Aviram, “Nietzsche as 
Educator?,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 25, no. 2 (1991): 219–34; Charles Bingham, “What 
Friedrich Nietzsche Cannot Stand about Education: Toward a Pedagogy of Self-Reformulation,” 
Educational Theory 51, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 337–52; Jacob Golomb, “Nietzsche’s Early Educational 
Thought,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 19, no. 1 (1985): 99–124; Thomas Edward Hart, Nietzsche, 
Culture and Education (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2009); James Scott Johnston, “Nietzsche as 
Educator: A Reexamination,” Educational Theory 48, no. 1 (1998): 67–83; Michael Peters, “Nietzsche, 
Poststructuralism and Education: After the Subject?,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 29, no. 1 
(January 1, 1997): 1–19; Eliyahu Rosenow, “Nietzsche’s Concept of Education,” in Nietzsche as 
Affirmative Thinker, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 1986), 119–31; Eliyahu 
Rosenow, “Nietzsche’s Educational Dynamite,” Educational Theory 39, no. 4 (1989): 307–16. 
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resort to alternate means of approximating unity, relying on political and bureaucratic forms of 
organization supported by a narrative of radical equality. It is in just such a context that the 
German research university emerges, broadening access to far greater numbers of students while 
at the same time applying the insights of bureaucratic organization to the work of scholarship. 
While such an institution can produce an endless array of new information on account of greater 
manpower, increasingly specialized investigations, and a commitment to positivistic methods, it 
cannot say what all the content it generates adds up to or even how the various pieces relate to 
each other. What’s worse, by forming society’s most talented youth in this mold, it actively 
works against the fostering of genius, which alone is capable of generating culture because of its 
ability to see beyond the fragments to a genuine whole. 
 
Man the Measure of All Things? 
 
Nietzsche himself recognizes a threshold difficulty for this argument, namely that it 
presupposes readers who have a disposition that he claims the system in which they were 
educated snuffs out. As he explains in the preface to the intended published form of the lectures, 
the “most important requirement is this: Under no circumstances may the reader constantly take 
himself to be the measure and criterion of all things, as modern man is so wont to do.”4 Leaving 
aside for the moment the puzzle of whether and how such readers can recognize and overcome 
this limitation, it is worth focusing on the limitation itself, since it represents the principal defect 
that plagues late modern education, and therefore culture and society, according to Nietzsche. 
Even if it is in some sense true that “man is the measure of all things,” modernity’s increasingly 
narrow focus on the individual threatened to corrupt the original sense of the aphorism 
                                               
4 Nietzsche, Anti-Education, 94. Note that, for reasons that remain unknown, Nietzsche did not end up 
publishing the lectures, as originally intended. 
 20 
altogether.5 The individual man is no measure for all things. To come into relation to all things, 
individuals must rather break out of the cramped and narrow confines of their own limited 
experience and understanding.  
In the course of the lectures, which take the form of an extended dialogue recollected 
from Nietzsche’s early years as a university student, the philosopher confesses his own youthful 
pretensions to education and the humiliation of coming to realize his ignorance. We find him in 
the first lecture hiking up to a remote spot above the Rhine with a fellow student to spend an 
evening ‘philosophizing,’ by which they mean making “serious resolutions and life plans.”6 As 
he explains, “we hoped to find, in solitary contemplation, something that would shape our 
innermost souls and satisfy those souls in the future.”7 Those naïve plans of self-discovery, 
Nietzsche tells us, are interrupted by an encounter with a real philosopher and his former student, 
who seeks guidance about how to respond to the devastating state of the educational system in 
which he now teaches. After convincing Nietzsche and his friend to leave them to speak in 
peace, the elderly philosopher dismisses the foolish students with a barb aimed at their 
understanding of philosophy: “the last thing I want to do is disturb your reflections about how 
best to become truly educated. I wish you the best of luck…and views…real brand-new well-
educated personal views.”8 Unable to resist the temptation to listen in on the conversation of the 
brash philosopher and his former student, Nietzsche and his friend eventually come to a 
realization that leaves them reeling: that they do not in fact know what education is nor are they 
nearly so educated as they had imagined. For Nietzsche’s argument in the lectures as a whole, 
                                               
5 This phrase became a mantra of the Renaissance humanists, retrieving a thread from Protagoras, the 
most prominent of the ancient Greek Sophists. 
6 Nietzsche, Anti-Education, 10. 
7 Nietzsche, 10. 
8 Nietzsche, 12. 
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the key here is the dramatic portrayal the episode provides of the fundamental conundrum 
identified in the preface. At issue in this debate is not merely the exercise of the rational faculty 
but the cultivation of a particular disposition of the will, which refuses to take the individual’s 
own limits as the definitive measure of reality. As Nietzsche and his friend come to realize, “our 
objections had hardly been purely intellectual: What had provoked our resistance to the 
philosopher’s speech apparently lay elsewhere.”9 But where exactly? The answer is humiliating. 
“Maybe what had spoken from our mouths was” not the well-considered conclusions of reason, 
but “only our instinctive fear that a man like him might not see us in a positive light; maybe all 
our earlier ideas now simply compelled us to reject his view, since his view completely rejected 
our own claim to culture and education.”10  
The reader who wishes to understand Nietzsche’s critique of education must cultivate the 
same disposition, one which is as critical of the system in which the reader was educated as it is 
of his own well-settled sense of self. “Let him be educated enough to think little of his own 
education, think scornfully even,” Nietzsche exhorts.11 Given the sorry state of culture and 
education, what is called for at least in the preliminary stage of reform is an avowal of ignorance 
reminiscent of Socrates, a condition which Nietzsche himself professes to share. The reader “can 
confidently follow the lead of an author who ventures to address him only from a place of 
ignorance, a perspective of knowing that he does not know. This author claims for himself 
nothing more than a burning sense of what is specific to our contemporary German barbarism.”12 
The nature of the problem dictates that even Nietzsche’s lectures themselves must be surpassed 
and ultimately cast aside, for they can only identify the problem in broad outline and then gesture 
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10 Nietzsche, 65. 
11 Nietzsche, 94. 
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 22 
in the direction of a solution. But this sputtering start, this shaking of quiet complacency, is the 
essential first movement toward the place from which bold new vision will be possible. “At least 
be readers of this book,” says Nietzsche, “so that later, through your actions, you can consign it 
to destruction and oblivion.”13 
 
Me-Sized Education and Research 
 
The opposite disposition, which takes as its definitive point of reference the individual, 
underlies all the gravest corruptions of late modern education and accounts for its inability to 
produce a coherent synthesis. In the German-speaking world that he describes, the problem, says 
Nietzsche, begins even before students arrive at university. Already in secondary school, the 
gymnasium, students are asked to form independent judgments of the material they are studying, 
thus long before they are actually in a position to do so with any real expertise. The rationale, as 
one character in the dialogue points out, is to inculcate the independence and self-sufficiency 
necessary to succeed in university. “This preparation,” says Nietzsche’s youthful companion, 
“was meant to make us independent enough to enjoy the extraordinary freedom of a university 
student—for no one in any sphere of life today is given as much freedom of choice and action as 
a student, it seems to me. He has to be his own guide for several years, across a wide plain left 
entirely open to him.”14 Later in the dialogue, the old philosopher will make clear that this 
freedom of choice in the university is precisely part of the problem. But before he can do so, the 
young Nietzsche himself rounds out his friend’s argument with further points in favor of 
fostering independence in students, not merely for its benefits to the individual student but for 
the far more exalted goal of advancing scholarship. Helping the student to develop self-
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confidence is, to be sure, the first step: “The individual must learn to delight in having his own 
goals and views of his own, so that he can walk without crutches later on. That is why he is 
encouraged to produce work so early, and criticism and sharp judgments earlier still.”15 
Ultimately, though, it is the way in which such exposure to great works at an early age can 
“awaken scholarly feelings” that argues most in favor of this model. “How many students,” asks 
the young Nietzsche, “have been seduced once for all by the charms of academic scholarship 
because they found in the gymnasium a new way of reading and caught it in their young fingers! 
The gymnasium student has to study all kinds of things, gather all kinds of knowledge, and this 
probably, little by little, creates in him a drive to study and gather in the same way at the 
university, on his own.”16 
The mature Nietzsche, who speaks through the voice of the old philosopher in the 
dialogue, finds virtually nothing in this argument persuasive. The actual effect of asking students 
to render a judgment before they are in a position to do so is to close off the possibility of real 
education at its very inception, replacing it with the seemingly easier act of making a judgment, 
which the student comes to understand as equivalent to pronouncing one’s own opinion. As the 
old philosopher explains, “a whole world of deeply intellectual and self-reflective tasks is 
presented to a surprised young man who has had practically no self-awareness up until that point, 
and made a matter of his own judgment.”17 After he recovers from the initial shock, the student 
eventually grows comfortable making pronouncements on matters quite beyond him. “[T]he 
dizzying feeling of having been asked to be independent gives the result a magical halo of 
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newness, destined never to return… From that point on, the young person feels himself to be 
finished: feels able, indeed encouraged to speak with anyone on equal terms.”18 
The structures of university life and studies serve only to confirm and intensify the 
message that independence and personal judgment are the bedrock values of education. To begin 
with, the late modern university defines the scope of its educational activity so narrowly as to 
exclude altogether that which takes place outside the lecture hall and seminar room. “Insofar as 
[the student] speaks, sees, or walks, or spends time in others’ company, or makes art—insofar as 
he lives and breathes, in short—he is independent, that is to say, not dependent on the 
educational institution,” remarks the old philosopher.19 Implied in such an arrangement is not 
merely that the student ought to have maximal freedom of choice outside the classroom, but 
inevitably also that education is restricted to formal academic settings. What’s worse, the logic of 
free choice extends even to the academic program itself, leaving much to the student’s discretion 
about what to study, in what order, and how. In such a system, the duties mutually owed between 
professor and student are highly attenuated, since the balance of responsibility falls to so great an 
extent on the individual. “This double independence” of student from professor and professor 
from student, “is glorified as ‘academic freedom,’” laments the old philosopher. “To make for 
even greater freedom, the [professor] can say whatever he wants, more or less, and the [student] 
can listen to whatever on offer he wants, more or less.”20 The outward appearance of the student-
professor relationship is thus retained (more or less) even as its meaning is thoroughly changed. 
If in other eras it was the master who designed the program of formation for the novice, in the 
late modern university such freedom and responsibility thus falls largely to the novice. As the old 
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philosopher notes, since “even the choice of what is to be listened to is a matter of the 
independent-minded student’s personal judgment, and since this student can refuse to believe 
anything he hears, can deny it all authority, the educational process is strictly speaking left in the 
student’s own hands.”21 
But what of the research activity of the university? Surely it constitutes a real excellence, 
perhaps even making up for the defects and decadence of the educational program to the extent 
that it eventually channels the best students into highly productive academic labor. Already in 
Nietzsche’s day German institutions had risen to global prominence for their revolutionary 
approach to scholarship, which resulted in the continual production of new information in ever 
more specialized fields of study. What goes unacknowledged in the midst of all this praise, says 
Nietzsche, is the way in which this all-consuming drive for specialization increasingly crowds 
out and ultimately undermines the kind of education necessary to make sense of all the various 
fragments of information. Once the transformation of the university is complete, he warns, there 
may indeed be many scholars who know a great deal about their narrow areas of study, but no 
one with a synthetic vision of the whole. In Nietzsche’s dialogue, the elderly philosopher’s 
former student puts the matter starkly: “the current system reduces scholars to being mere slaves 
of academic disciplines, making it a matter of chance, and increasingly unlikely, for any scholar 
to turn out truly educated. Academic study is spread across such a large area now that anyone 
with real but unexceptional talents and academic ambitions will devote himself to a narrowly 
specialized subfield, remaining totally unconcerned with everything else.”22 The startling result 
is that even the highly trained scholar is no better equipped than anyone else to address matters 
outside his field. In that sense, says the philosopher’s former student, “A scholar with such a 
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rarified specialty is like a factory worker who spends his entire life doing nothing but making 
one single screw.”23  
What makes such a development so insidious, according to Nietzsche, is the fact that it is 
no mere hapless biproduct of an otherwise praiseworthy advance. On the contrary, it is rooted in 
the same effort to accommodate the institutions of society to the measure of modern man that has 
so deformed the educational process. Nietzsche himself was trained as a classical philologist, and 
he employs an extended discussion of the field’s self-imposed limitations to illustrate a 
phenomenon common to the university as a whole. Existential engagement of the scholar with 
the object of his study is now out of the question, either because it has come to seem 
methodologically dubious or (what Nietzsche thinks is even more likely) too uncomfortable. 
“Today,” as the old philosopher explains, “whether consciously or unconsciously, philologists 
have largely come to the conclusion that any direct contact with classical antiquity on their part 
is pointless and hopeless. Even they [of all scholars] consider such studies sterile, derivative, and 
obsolete.”24 In its place, a purely historical and positivistic method reigns supreme. Avoiding 
altogether the question of what a text has to say to its reader, the philologist turns instead to 
strictly objective questions such as how the text was produced, what sources the authors drew on 
in creating it, and what textual variants in various manuscripts can tell us about its most authentic 
form. Such a dramatic change in method amounts, not to a development within the field, but to 
an abandonment of philology in favor of something quite different: “linguistics,” which the old 
philosopher discounts as “an endless expanse of freshly cleared arable land where even the most 
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limited minds can now find useful employment, where the very modesty of their ambition is 
considered a positive virtue, for a rank-and-file piece of work is exactly what is most desired.”25  
Nietzsche’s point is not simply that such research is trivial by comparison with true 
philology. Rather, his fundamental concern is that, when it poses as philology, it effectively 
dissolves the one kind of scholarly engagement that can actually make sense of the ancient 
world—and ultimately, he thinks, our own. In the sanitized world of linguistics and other such 
positivist forms of investigation, explains the old philosopher, “no majestic voice resounds from 
the ruined world of antiquity to rebuff the newcomer. All who approach are welcomed with open 
arms; even someone on whom Sophocles and Aristophanes have never made any particular 
impression.”26 Under such conditions, they will never succeed at encountering the real Greece in 
all its greatness. On the contrary, they will encounter only themselves and their own limitations, 
inevitably reading their own world back into the subject that they study. “They simply set up 
shop amid the ruins as comfortably as you please,” observes the philosopher’s former student. 
“Then there is great rejoicing when they find in these ancient surroundings what they themselves 
have smuggled in.”27 He rattles off a list of such projects: hunting down contradictions in Homer, 
re-interpreting the Oedipus trilogy as a proto-Christian admonition to meekness and gentility, 
counting lines and syllables in Greek and Roman poetry in search of hidden ratios. The same 
kind of trivialization has effectively “banished” philosophy from the university as well. 
“Historical… considerations have slowly but surely taken the place of any profound exploration 
of the eternal problems. The question becomes: What did this or that philosopher think or not 
think? And is this or that text rightly ascribed to him or not?”28 By thus circumscribing the scope 
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of enquiry, the university guarantees a steady stream of answers to questions of minimal 
importance relative to those that cannot be asked. 
 
Culture and the Metaphysics of Genius 
 
Whether consciously acknowledged or not, a certain metaphysics is implied by the 
structure of the German research university as Nietzsche describes it. It takes as the basic unit of 
reality the individual, whose independence it fosters in education and whose average powers of 
intellect and will it takes as the proper measure of research. The result, says Nietzsche, is a staid 
and homogenous mediocrity that eliminates all possibility of corporate greatness—indeed, that 
works constantly against the emergence of any genuine corporate reality at all. This outcome is a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: to posit the individual as the fundamental reality necessarily implies that 
any attempt at corporate organization can have only derivative status at best. But it is also 
problem: if each individual constitutes a whole unto himself, what happens when such units 
come in contact with each other, as they inevitably do in society? Into this vacuum steps the 
modern state, which on Nietzsche’s account simultaneously seeks to maintain the narrative of the 
radical equality of individuals even as it sets itself up as the ultimate principle of integration. 
Nowhere was this logic more baldly on display than in the highly centralized Prussian state in 
which the research university was born.29 Claiming for itself comprehensive oversight of society, 
Prussia sought to “subordinat[e] all educational aspirations to state purposes” and did so under 
the self-imposed moniker “culture-state” (Kulturstaat).30 For Nietzsche, the adopted title is 
telling, since it reverses the hierarchical ordering of state and culture that he claims existed in the 
ancient world. As the old philosopher explains in the dialogue, “The [ancient Greek] state was 
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not the culture’s border patrol and regulator, its watchman and warden, but the culture’s sturdy, 
muscular, battle-ready comrade and companion, escorting his admired, nobler, and so to speak 
transcendent friend through harsh reality and earning that friend’s gratitude in return.”31 In the 
ancient world, that is, culture was king. 
With this we arrive at Nietzsche’s core insight and conviction, on the basis of which 
proceeds his entire critique of late modern education and society in these inaugural lectures. 
States come and go, as do individuals, without leaving anything but the barest traces once they 
have disappeared. But the light of true cultural achievement shines undimmed across the ages, 
revealing an almost bewildering solidity that makes everything else seem insubstantial and 
unreal by comparison. The whole remarkable phenomenon of Greek culture may be likened to a 
single massive statue which, now found lying on the ground, not only sums up in itself the 
astonishing age that produced it but also rebuffs the attempts of lesser ages to hoist it anew. “You 
should know,” says the old philosopher’s former student, “that philologists have spent centuries 
trying to raise once more the statue of Greek antiquity, long since fallen and sunk into the 
earth—and they have never succeeded, for it is a colossus, on which any individual can only 
clamber around like a dwarf.”32 Having been produced by a society functioning as an integral 
whole, no individual is equal to the task. Even entire societies are thoroughly dwarfed by the task 
when they comprise nothing more than individuals gathered together in mere approximations of 
wholeness, as in modern political and bureaucratic forms of organization. The former student 
goes on, “Tremendous collective efforts, all the leverage of modern culture, have been brought to 
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bear, and again and again this statue, barely raised from the ground, has fallen back to crush 
those beneath it.”33 
It is at this point that we can at last begin to piece together Nietzsche’s positive account 
of where wholeness is to be found, albeit with some preliminary caveats. Three features of the 
lectures complicate the task at hand. First, the work is framed in negative terms as a critique. 
Now a critique is possible only on the basis of an implicit standard, but identifying that positive 
standard may require the same kind of imaginative reconstruction as when one envisions a 
photograph on the basis of its negative. Second, as noted earlier, the lectures take the form of a 
dialogue rather than a straightforward exposition, requiring that we sort through the various 
voices to arrive at the argument in much the same way one does in engaging a text of Plato or 
Kierkegaard. Finally, the aphoristic style that Nietzsche would eventually adopt as his 
characteristic form of expression is already present here in the elliptical way his characters make 
their arguments. It frequently falls to the reader, therefore, to interrogate and spell out what is 
only alluded to in highly suggestive fragments of arguments and in the novel use of standard 
vocabulary from the long history of philosophy.  
The implicit core of Nietzsche’s argument is that culture constitutes a true whole, indeed 
that it is the unique reality of which wholeness can be predicated. What is the basis for such an 
argument? Once it becomes clear what Nietzsche understands by the concept of culture, which 
shares nothing in common with modern sociological usage, the claim is all the more striking; and 
Nietzsche is fully aware that it is bound to confound his audience. While one can speak of 
“modern culture” in an analogical or colloquial sense, the true standard of culture, according to 
Nietzsche, is revealed in classical antiquity. This is not to say that culture is identical with the 
                                               
33 Nietzsche, 45. 
 31 
forms particular to ancient Greece and Rome, as if the task were merely to preserve and attempt 
to inhabit the achievements of an earlier age, still less to produce new works that slavishly copy 
older forms. Rather, we can recognize in antiquity a definitive image of a society in which true 
culture has been realized, a universal phenomenon that remains a possibility in other eras in ever 
new permutations. It is for this reason that the old philosopher in Nietzsche’s dialogue can affirm 
that he “cling[s] to the German spirit” and expresses his “hope that in future the schools will 
draw true culture into the battle and…inspire the younger generation with a burning passion for 
what is truly German.”34 Key to this renewal, which must plumb the depths of all that is most 
authentically German, is contact with the greatness of ancient Greece, even if the process of 
cross-fertilization is neither obvious nor linear. “The link between the innermost essence of the 
German and the genius of the Greek is a mysterious bond,” which he also acknowledges is 
“extremely difficult to grasp.”35 But of this much he is certain: that the realization of true culture 
in the German idiom depends on first catching sight of the Greek achievement. “[U]ntil the true 
German spirit, in its noblest and uttermost need, reaches out for the saving hand of the Greek 
genius, as though for a firm handhold in the raging river of barbarism; until an all-consuming 
desire for what is Greek breaks forth from this German spirit; until the distant view of the Greek 
homeland, laboriously achieved, with which Schiller and Goethe refreshed their spirits has 
become a place of pilgrimage for the best and most gifted among us,” the goal of true education 
and culture will merely “flutter about in the air, untethered to anything.”36 
Even with this clarification in hand, that by culture Nietzsche does not simply mean 
Greek culture, the question still remains in what sense it constitutes a whole unlike any other. 
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Here we must make explicit what Nietzsche himself only hints at and seems to assume. There is 
a twofold sense in which culture possesses a fullness that all other realities lack and gathers all 
things into a unity. First, as demonstrated by the remarkable artifacts of ancient Greece—poetry, 
music, architecture, philosophy—the products of culture represent the most complex phenomena 
in existence, owing their origin to the creative activity of man. While drawing upon the natural 
order in the process, cultural creation is not reducible to a merely natural or automatic 
phenomenon but rather brings nature into a synthesis effected by man’s activity. It has the power 
to make of all things a Gesamtkunstwerk—a total work of art—realizing on the grand scale the 
kind of unity opera has the capacity to forge among the arts according to Richard Wagner, whom 
Nietzsche still deeply admired at the time of the lectures.37 Second, while culture in the sense 
Nietzsche understands it necessarily depends on the activity of an elite, he insists that it alone is 
capable of uniting both masses and the elite. The fact that their experiences of the one same 
culture are mediated by different points of contact does not undermine the truth of this unity. 
“The deeper regions where the masses come into true contact with culture are” those traditions in 
which “a people harbors its religious instincts, where it continues to create its mythical images, 
where it stays faithful to its customs, its law, its native soil.”38 These are the conventional forms 
that a culture gives rise to, and efforts to bypass them in the interest of eliding the differences 
between people serves only to degrade culture and to bar the simple from access to it. “The 
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people are given ‘culture’ in only a crude and completely external way when that is the direct 
goal.”39  
How then does culture emerge on Nietzsche’s telling? It is an elite phenomenon, but 
understanding precisely what Nietzsche means by “elite” requires careful parsing. For what he 
clearly does not mean is simply those with more power or influence in society. In fact, it is 
precisely such figures who he claims are typically responsible for thwarting the rise of culture. 
The elite that Nietzsche has in mind is the genius. But before considering that rare phenomenon, 
we must look at what Nietzsche considers the ordinary state of affairs, the improbable context 
out of which the genius must emerge for culture to appear. That context is, in short, Nature, 
which appropriately appears in capitalized form in the English translation of Nietzsche’s text. 
There are two faces to Nature in Nietzsche’s thought: on the one hand, the relentless force of 
destruction and renewal that shows little concern for any individual, and on the other, the source 
of pristine and awe-inspiring forms that point to a latent potential to be shaped into something 
great. The second of these constitutes above all the condition for the possibility of culture. And it 
is direct contact with this reality that proves the most important aspect of the education of 
children who show promise of greatness. “Forest and stone, the storm, the vulture, the single 
flower, butterfly and meadow and mountainside must speak to him in their own tongue—he must 
be able to see himself in them as though in countless mirrors and reflection…and he will 
unconsciously feel the metaphysical oneness of all things in the great symbol of Nature, while 
also drawing peace from its eternal perseverance and necessity.”40 On the other hand, it is this 
same Nature that constantly puts human life in question, whose eternal processes are calibrated 
in favor of Life itself and not in favor of one’s own individual existence. “A person needs to 
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learn much if he is to live, to fight his battle for survival,” says the old philosopher. But he insists 
that “everything [a person] learns and does with that aim, as an individual, has nothing to do with 
education and culture.”41 Culture pertains instead to that “atmosphere far above the world of 
necessity, scarcity, and struggle.”42 Here is where we see the vital distinction between the true 
elite, understood as genius, and the person who is merely able to marshal Promethean efforts 
toward the hopeless cause of individual survival. Such people long for immortality and seek it in 
all manner of things that can in no way deliver it: “riches, power, intelligence, quickness of 
mind, eloquence, a healthy appearance, a famous name.” They will succeed in nothing more than 
“enlarg[ing] their subjective needs and sphere of influence to construct a mausoleum of 
astounding size for themselves, as if they could thereby defeat that monstrous adversary, time.”43  
There is, by contrast, a distinct selflessness that marks the elite who are capable giving 
birth to real culture. These, rather than concentrating on the personal struggle for survival, “rise 
up quickly and easily into the sphere in which they can forget and as it were shake off their own 
selfhood.”44 With an eye on what is eternal even in the midst of constant change, they will find 
within their contemporary world precisely the resources needed to craft yet another expression of 
Nature’s highest possibilities. The genius thus stands at a critical juncture between the particular 
and the universal, the daily reality of his people and a timeless continuity that stretches across 
ages. But this raises a puzzling riddle: what can explain the origin of such genius? Here 
Nietzsche’s dialogue takes a decidedly mystical turn. “The genius,” says the old philosopher, “is 
not actually born of culture, or education: His origin is, as it were metaphysical—his homeland 
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metaphysical.”45 Unable to say more than this, the old philosopher simply moves on to consider 
how one so rooted in the eternal comes to immerse himself in the contingent reality of a people 
and age. But the philosopher’s former student at least gives voice to how difficult and apparently 
incomplete is the proffered account: “Teacher…you amaze me with this metaphysics of genius, 
and I have only a dim sense of the truth in these metaphors.”46 For true culture to emerge, so it 
seems, the latent possibilities of Nature must be informed by some eternal reality. But what 
precisely that reality is must remain a question mark. What one can say on the basis of this 
aphoristic fragment alone is that, for Nietzsche, the fundamental unit of reality is genius. 
Individuals come and go; even Nature itself merely contains the conditions for the possibility of 
this reality. But by appropriating the language of metaphysics, the dialogue implies that being 
may be predicated most truly and fully of genius.  
It is genius, we might recall, that mediates the appearance of the whole, namely culture. 
How then does the genius perform the critical act of mediation? Here again the old philosopher 
must resort to language that is highly mystical. Perhaps Nietzsche would chafe at the thought, 
but the resonances of Christian theology, which are already evident to some degree elsewhere in 
the text, break fully into the open here. The genius, says the old philosopher, must be “ripened in 
the womb and nourished in the lap of his people’s culture.” Only then will he be able “to appear, 
to emerge from a people; to reflect as it were in its full array of colors the whole image of a 
people and its strengths.” Perhaps it is possible up to this point to read these lines in a strictly 
natural sense that might well apply to any great leader, who must be brought up in the authentic 
traditions of his people. But the old philosopher goes further. This genius, whose origin is 
metaphysical, must sum up in his very person the whole nation in order to bring them in an act of 
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great liberation into the eternal. He will “reveal this people’s highest purpose in the symbolic 
essence of one individual and his enduring work, thereby linking his people to the eternal and 
liberating his people from the ever-changing sphere of the momentary.”47 
 
Culture, the Will, and the University 
 
Nietzsche’s account of the essential role of geniuses in the realization of culture would 
seem to undermine the central purpose of his lectures, the critique of educational institutions. For 
as the old philosopher has noted, strictly speaking, genius is not produced by education. 
Furthermore, institutions are by definition for large numbers of people, whereas genius appears 
only rarely. It would seem, then, that all discussion of reforming educational institutions is quite 
beside the point. In fact, the young Nietzsche and his student companion in the dialogue raise 
precisely this objection: “if we can truly speak of ‘culture’ only with respect to these most distant 
beings, how could their incalculable nature be the basis of an institution—what would it even 
mean to imagine educational institutions that benefit solely these chosen few?”48 The question 
provokes the unremitting ire of the old philosopher, and presumably the mature Nietzsche for 
whom he typically speaks. The role of educational institutions, he insists, is not to cultivate 
genius but rather to prepare for them collaborators who can both recognize genius and aid in the 
construction of true culture. At the very least, such institutions should provide the same 
protective function as the ancient state, fending off the inevitable attacks on the development and 
hegemony of culture by those pursuing less noble and more individualistic aims. For most of 
history, says the old philosopher, exactly the opposite relation obtained. “Not one of our great 
geniuses has ever received any assistance from you…it was in spite of you that they created their 
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immortal works… Who can imagine what these heroic men might have accomplished if the true 
German spirit had been able to spread its sheltering roof above their heads in the form of strong 
institutions?”49  
The core educational program required for such institutions consists of a simple three-
part structure, says the old philosopher. Students must be trained in philosophy, art, and Greco-
Roman culture. Why these three, and what precisely does he mean by each? By philosophy, he 
does not mean the narrowly technical form of enquiry that had already become characteristic of 
an increasingly professionalized discipline by the late nineteenth century. What he has in mind is 
rather engagement with the most difficult and fundamental questions about existence. Such 
questions inevitably arise in the course of one’s own personal development. “We are so beset by 
serious and difficult problems,” he says, “that, when brought to see them aright, we quickly 
acquire a lasting philosophical wonder… Especially in tempestuous youth, almost every personal 
incident shimmers with a double reflection: as an instance of everyday triviality, and at the same 
time as exemplifying an eternal, mysterious problem that cries out for an answer.”50 The 
experience has the effect of revealing possibilities latent in nature which until now have not been 
apparent to the young person, as if something that was one-dimensional suddenly discloses 
another hidden dimension. “A young person has suddenly and almost instinctively been 
convinced of the double meaning of existence.”51 If he is to recognize and cooperate with genius, 
the essential starting point will be this conviction that there is more to reality than what simply 
appears—a conviction weakened, indeed stamped out, by the positivistic method elevated by the 
German research university. The development of “a strict artistic discipline” contributes to the 
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same objective in addition to clarifying that it is possible to speak of standards of excellence in 
art, contrary to the prevailing opinion that art was a matter of individual taste.52 The old 
philosopher does not elaborate at this point in the dialogue, but earlier he has asked, “Who 
among you will attain a true feeling for the sacred earnestness of art when you are spoiled with 
methods that encourage you to stutter on your own when you should be taught to speak, to 
pursue the beautiful on your own when you should be made to piously worship the artwork.”53 
Much has already been said also about classical antiquity and its unique value as a witness to 
true culture. Perhaps for this reason, the old philosopher does not say more to justify its place in 
the educational program except to recall that it is “the categorical imperative incarnate of all 
culture.”54 
Given the hostility to greatness that Nietzsche finds not only at the level of society but 
also within the individual, he recognizes that the educational program cannot be a matter of 
content alone. It also involves, and even more fundamentally, the training of the will. In fact, 
eras productive of cultural achievement are distinctive for having cultivated “dependence, 
discipline, subordination, and obedience—resisting with all their might every delusion of 
independence.”55 Indeed, the old philosopher puts the matter categorically: “all education begins 
with obedience.”56 The student must submit to the arduous and initially unpleasant experience of 
being guided through a course not of his own choosing, not however because of the inherent 
value of submissiveness of will. Quite on the contrary, those students who prove truly capable 
will eventually be required to exercise the authority proper to their place atop the natural 
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hierarchy. Rather, the strictest of obedience is required so that they will develop a well-formed 
aesthetic: a sense for what is truly noble.  
The place where such a sense must first be formed, says the old philosopher, is in the 
study of one’s own native language in secondary school. This is the essential preparation for the 
definitive encounter with philosophy, art, and classical culture at university, studies which 
presuppose an ability to perceive excellence in the midst of endless kitsch and mediocrity. “Only 
rigorously disciplined, artistically scrupulous linguistic standards can create a proper feeling for 
the greatness of our classical writers,” explains the old philosopher. “[O]ne must know from 
personal experience how difficult language is; after searching long and struggling hard, one must 
reach on one’s own the path our great poets stride, if one is to feel how lightly and gracefully 
they walk it and how stiffly and awkwardly others follow in their footsteps.”57 The inevitable 
frustration the student feels in attempting to imitate the highest standards of speaking and writing 
is indispensable for rooting his sense of form so deeply as to become second nature—indeed, to 
the point that he feels revulsion for anything less than that which is truly good. “Let no one think 
it easy to develop one’s sensitivity to the point of physical nausea,” says the old philosopher, 
“but let no one hope that it is possible to acquire an aesthetic sense along any other path except 
the thorny one of language.”58 But the ones who thus persevere in the struggle to rise above their 
own their own narrowness and that of their age are rewarded with entrance to a lofty atmosphere 
in which the peaks of true culture can at last come into view. Uniquely among all people, they 
are ready for education. “The awakening of this sensibility, able to distinguish between form and 
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abomination, is the first flutter of the wing that can carry [them] to the only true homeland of 
culture: Greek antiquity.”59 
______________ 
 
 
There are any number of lines along which a critique of Nietzsche’s theory might 
proceed: that his view of classical antiquity is unbalanced and romanticized, that his 
dismissiveness of all positivistic research is extreme and untenable, that his critique of 
individualism over-corrects in the direction of a simplistic elitism. For the purposes of this study, 
though, two other critiques have far greater force than any of these, since they concern 
philosophical problems raised by the very structure of the argument itself and not merely with 
matters of practical judgment and contingency. First, the key condition of the possibility of 
culture is merely assumed rather than explained. How is it that Nature has a latent capacity to be 
shaped in such a way as to give rise to culture when acted upon by the genius? What explains 
this order, what is its source? To answer this challenge adequately, Nietzsche would have to have 
recourse to a much more elaborate metaphysics, and even in his mature works it is not clear that 
this is something he is able or willing to supply. Indeed, given his emphasis on the foundational 
character of action and the will, one might well conclude that Nietzsche seeks to substitute ethics 
for metaphysics. Still the question remains. Second, his argument in these lectures seems to 
suggest, by contrast, that aesthetics is even more fundamental than ethics. For the genius cannot 
act to construct an instantiation of true culture in his own age without a sense of form. But this 
sense of form can only refer to the ability to perceive in a universal way the excellence that lies 
beyond any particular instantiation of it. Nietzsche’s extraordinary inaugural lectures thus leave 
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us with a powerful demonstration of how culture can be said to constitute a genuine whole and 
yet which also seems to point beyond itself to other spheres with an even stronger claim. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The Whole Extrapolated from Fragments: 
 
MacIntyre, Cosmology, and the Intellect 
 
 
 
 
If a critique of the modern research university represents the first word of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, it seems increasingly likely to be the last word of Alasdair MacIntyre’s. During his 
final academic post, which he held at the University of Notre Dame from 2000 to 2010, the 
formerly Marxist philosopher best known for reviving Aristotelian virtue ethics increasingly 
turned his attention to the state of the university, sounding the alarm about the incoherence into 
which both its teaching and research activities have fallen. The turn seems to have been 
prompted, at least in part, by his taking up long-term residence for the first time in a Catholic-run 
university after having spent the vast part of his fifty-year academic career prior to that in secular 
institutions, and discovering surprisingly little difference between them. “[W]hat in fact we 
find,” says MacIntyre, “is that the most prestigious Catholic universities often mimic the 
structures and goals of the most prestigious secular universities and do so with little sense of 
something having gone seriously amiss.”1 In an article written for a general audience, he puts the 
matter even more colorfully: “the major Catholic universities…are for the most part hell-bent on 
imitating their prestigious secular counterparts, which already imitate one another. So we find 
Notre Dame glancing nervously at Duke, only to catch Duke in the act of glancing nervously at 
Princeton.”2  
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But what, on MacIntyre’s telling, has gone wrong in the university? It is not, strictly 
speaking, the role that feverish competition plays in institutional decision-making, still less a 
sectarian concern that religion is marginal to the life of the institutions that others are eager to 
imitate. The problem is rather the profound fragmentation of higher education. “[T]he 
contemporary secular university is not at fault because it is not Catholic,” claims MacIntyre. “It 
is at fault insofar as it is not a university.”3 To understand precisely what MacIntyre means by 
this, and the real novelty of the claim, will require attention to his characteristically careful and 
nuanced argument. For he is far from the first scholar to note the fragmentation of the modern 
university. As MacIntyre himself points out, the legendary president of the University of 
California, Clark Kerr, was already speaking of the “multiversity” in the early 1960s, and his 
book The Uses of the University remains in print and widely read to this day.4 It should come as 
no surprise, though, if what a philosopher understands by fragmentation is significantly different 
from what an economist and university administrator does, even if they concern aspects of the 
same phenomenon. For MacIntyre, the critical question is whether all the various activities of the 
university constitute an intelligible unity: whether, that is, the university itself equips its 
members to understand how, for example, investigations into the properties of subatomic 
particles are related to the study of game theory in economics and Troubadour poetry in 
literature. Not only does the modern research university not do this, it does not even recognize 
such integration as necessary. “For there is no sense in the contemporary American university 
that there is such a task, that something that matters is being left undone.”5 Rather each discipline 
conducts its work fully independently of the others, its horizon shaped by the scope of enquiry 
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proper to its particular methods. Indeed, even within disciplines, questions and methods have 
been refined to the point that it is no longer clear to what degree the discipline itself represents a 
genuine unity, with scholars increasingly working within ever more specialized subfields that 
have little to do with each other in practice. But this state of affairs, says MacIntyre, threatens the 
very existence of the university, not in the mere practical sense of its governability as an 
administrative unit, but in the far more radical sense of its capacity to fulfill precisely the task it 
sets for itself: to achieve an increasingly adequate understanding of the world in all its various 
dimensions. How so? 
Even if we speak colloquially at times of the “world” of business or of music or some 
other field, we do not mean that these activities and the study of them exist in anything other 
than the one world we share. Because the world is one, so too must be the knowledge of all its 
many aspects. Individual disciplines and sub-disciplines can pursue their enquiries along the ever 
multiplying paths that they forge, but to the extent that they claim to arrive at knowledge in the 
process, they are making a universal appeal that necessarily implicates all the others. If the 
various disciplines do, in fact, arrive at genuine knowledge, it must ultimately be possible to give 
an account of how the knowledge achieved in particular enquiries relate to each other. This set of 
relations, together with the content of each field, constitutes the intelligible order of all things 
that is the ultimate object of the university and also therefore the source of its unity. “We are able 
to understand what the university should be,” says MacIntyre, “only if we understand what the 
universe is.”6 By its very orientation to the whole, that is, the university implies a cosmology. 
And the fulfillment of its work depends on ongoing dialogue between the ever more refined 
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enquiries of particular fields and this rational account of the general order in which each finds its 
place. 
For the purposes of this study, MacIntyre’s claim that cosmology is the whole that makes 
sense of all the various fragments of the universe is of even greater significance than his critique 
of the contemporary university, which proposes to operate without a cosmology. But to 
understand his positive claim, it is worth beginning with his negative assessment of where things 
stand since it illuminates the multiprong effects of the current approach on teaching, research, 
and even patterns of life in society at large, all of which can be summed up under the heading of 
compartmentalization. Beginning with his critique also clarifies how MacIntyre arrives at his 
conclusion about what is to be done: since it is philosophy that has the capacity to unite all the 
various forms of enquiry and ultimately to adumbrate a cosmology, it will have to resume its 
place at the center of the university, reversing its more recent transformation into a specialized 
discipline in imitation of the others. For reasons that MacIntyre explains in some detail, such a 
philosophy will have to be explicitly theistic, since all intelligibility must ultimately rest on the 
existence of a source of all being that is its own cause. Indeed, in order to achieve complete 
integration, each discipline will have to be brought into relation with theology. But for 
MacIntyre, as indeed for his key points of reference, Aquinas and Newman, it is to philosophy 
that the crucial task of integration belongs. 
 
Compartmentalization in Life and Thought 
 
While MacIntyre and Nietzsche offer differing accounts of what has gone wrong in the 
university, they agree that one of the principal causes is the increasingly narrow specialization by 
scholars, the lasting fruit of the nineteenth-century revolution in the German academy. For 
Nietzsche, the problem with circumscribing scholarship in such a way is that it undermines the 
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possibility of coming into contact with true cultural achievement, which constitutes an integral 
whole and can only be perceived as such. Slicing up phenomena into smaller pieces for analysis 
not only reduces scholarship to menial labor, but also deprives the scholar of precisely the broad 
horizon and sense for greatness that is required to recognize genius. For MacIntyre, by contrast, 
the problem is not the division of scholarly tasks into ever more focused and narrow enquiries, 
but rather the threat such specialization poses to the very coherence of those enquiries when they 
begin to be understood as radically independent of all the others. Since the refinement of 
research involves the pursuit of increasingly differentiated enquiries, an inherently centrifugal 
logic is at play in scholarly work. It is only a deliberate effort to keep the overall order of things 
in view that prevents the otherwise positive pursuit of new enquiries from resulting in an 
exaggerated, and ultimately incoherent, sense of their mutual independence.  
To casual observers of the university, the various academic departments and individual 
members of the community may well appear an evident and unproblematic whole, united by an 
institutional identity, campus, administration, and above all, joint educational effort. But as 
MacIntyre knows, the experience of those at the heart of the institution, the faculty members, 
reveals a different reality altogether. The history of increasing specialization has created ever 
stronger incentives for scholars to engage peers in their field at other institutions at a much 
deeper level and with greater regularity than scholars in other fields at their own university. Their 
“professional success and standing depend in large part on the degree of their identification with 
some particular subdiscipline or subsubdiscipline.”7 As enquiries have become more narrowly 
defined, it is only the peers in their academic specialty that understand and are interested in the 
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precise set of questions that frame the scholar’s work; and it is the same group of peers that will 
determine whether the scholar’s papers are accepted for presentation and publication.  
This re-balancing of the academy’s center of gravity toward networks of specialists and 
away from the university has inevitably, if subtly, altered the way that knowledge itself is 
viewed. For it has become clear, to scholars at least, that knowledge is a product, not so much of 
the university, as of the fields that play a decisive role in the organization and recognition of 
scholarly work. This gives the impression, explains MacIntyre, that “[t]here is…nothing to 
understanding except what is supplied by the specialized and professionalized disciplines and 
subdisciplines and subsubdisciplines. Higher education has become a set of assorted and 
heterogeneous specialized enquiries into a set of assorted and heterogeneous subject-matters.”8 
This impression is virtually guaranteed to go unexamined by the very logic of system itself. With 
every discipline engaged in its own investigations, to whom in the university does it fall to ask 
about the system of academic enquiry as a whole? And even if there is such a discipline, how 
could its findings have any effect outside its own discipline? In the past, explains MacIntyre, 
philosophy filled this role, and its universal relevance to all the various enquiries in the 
university was uncontroversial. But now that philosophy has been transformed into one 
discipline among others, its findings have no more relevance to the enquiries of other specialized 
fields than do those of chemistry, psychology, or communications. Thus the powerful impression 
that knowledge is inherently disciplinary in nature and origin not only goes unchallenged but 
necessarily strengthens with time. The practical result is that what began as an unreflective 
assumption eventually hardens into a positive conviction: that there is no meaningful sense in 
which we may speak of a unified order of all things. As MacIntyre explains, “the conception of 
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the university presupposed by and embodied in the institutional forms and activities of 
contemporary research universities is not just one that has nothing much to do with any 
particular conception of the universe, but one that suggests strongly that there is no such thing as 
the universe, no whole of which the subject matters studied by the various disciplines are all 
parts or aspects, but instead just a multifarious set of assorted subject matters.”9  
Nor do the effects of such a view remain confined to the realm of research. They extend 
to the educational program of the university. Here again, to the casual observer, which includes 
most students and their parents, the underlying fragmentation may not be obvious. Every ten 
years or so, universities undertake a revision of the curriculum, at the end of which they typically 
produce a document explaining the coherence of its animating vision and how the novel features 
represent the cutting edge of pedagogy. Often such documents positively crackle with 
buzzwords—interdisciplinarity, team teaching, technology integration—but the basic structure of 
the undergraduate curriculum in most American universities has not changed since the 1930s. 
There are general education requirements spread across a variety of fields, a major area of 
concentration in one field, and a certain number of electives. The layman might reasonably 
conclude that such a curriculum successfully marries breadth and depth. As MacIntyre points 
out, though, the courses that fulfill each of those elements of the curriculum are designed and 
taught by scholars whose own training has been oriented more and more narrowly to particular 
specialties. Therefore, “what students learn in their major, whatever the discipline, has more and 
more become what they need to learn if they are to become specialists in that particular 
discipline.”10 Even the courses they take for the purposes of general education or elective 
exploration are invariably marked by the same logic of specialization that shapes the professional 
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development of the professoriate. “[W]hatever pattern of courses is taken by an individual, it is 
unlikely to be more than a collection of bits and pieces, a specialist’s grasp of this, a 
semispecialist’s partial understanding of that, an introductory survey of something else.”11 Thus 
the practical reality of contemporary higher education no longer matches its historic aspirations, 
even if they remain enshrined in requirements ordered to integration. MacIntyre puts the case in 
forceful terms: “And how indeed could it be otherwise when every course, even when 
introductory, is a course in a specialized discipline taught by a teacher who may be vastly 
ignorant of everything outside her or his own discipline? Each part of the curriculum is 
someone’s responsibility, but no one has a responsibility for making the connections between the 
parts.”12 
If the educational program of the university fails to make connections among different 
disciplines, it is unsurprising that what happens in the classroom remains largely disconnected 
from the other spheres of life on campus too. The residence hall, the dining hall, and the 
recreation center play host to the activity proper to each, but without a sense of how they might 
be related to the academic program or indeed how each might be related to the others. MacIntyre 
thus highlights a phenomenon that Nietzsche also considered deeply significant: what the student 
does outside of the classroom is a matter above all for the private judgment of the student. For 
Nietzsche, such a conception of the relationship between university and student represents a 
dereliction of the university’s obligation to form comprehensively the tastes of the student. For 
MacIntyre, by contrast, it is the consistency and coherence of education that is at stake. Failing to 
integrate the various spheres of university life betrays “an uncritical attitude toward the norms 
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and values of each particular compartmentalized area, arising from an inability to bring to bear 
what has been learned in each such area of one’s life upon the activities of the other area.”13  
The concept of compartmentalization here is key. MacIntyre sees it as one of the 
characteristic features of societies in the condition of advanced modernity. Without proposing to 
account for the origin of the phenomenon and the degree to which developments in the university 
itself may have played a part, he insists that understanding it is an essential task for the university 
because of its pervasive influence on contemporary patterns of thought and behavior. According 
to the logic of this cultural norm, explains MacIntyre, “[e]ach of the separate spheres of activity 
through which individuals pass in the course of a day or a week or a month has its own 
distinctive culture, its own mode of relationship, its own specific norms. And in each of these 
spheres individuals can function effectively only by presenting themselves in and through 
whatever roles they occupy in this or that particular sphere.”14 At home, therefore, I am one 
person, at work another, and when relaxing with my buddies a different person from either of the 
other two. The refrain from a popular country song a little over a decade ago captured the 
sentiment memorably: “I don’t have to be me ‘til Monday.” The social and economic conditions 
of late modernity have made it possible and even necessary for people to belong to a variety of 
different spheres. But without simultaneously supplying a sense of how all those spheres form a 
genuine whole, the trend puts the integration of the individual himself in question. “And so in 
extreme cases,” says MacIntyre, “the individual is nearly, if not quite, dissolved into the set of 
roles that she or he plays.”15 The problem is only exacerbated by the fact that the phenomenon 
remains largely unacknowledged and indeed difficult for an individual to detect. The 
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thoroughgoing partitioning of late modern life into various spheres conspires against exactly the 
kind of holistic viewpoint from which alone it is possible to take stock of the different roles one 
plays. As MacIntyre notes, “There is increasingly nowhere within compartmentalized societies in 
which individuals are invited in a practically effective way to view their lives as a whole, to 
evaluate themselves and those qualities that belong to them as individuals, the virtues and the 
vices, rather than those that belong to them as successful or unsuccessful role-players.”16 
It is precisely here that MacIntyre sees a nexus between Catholicism, the university, and 
the cultural malaise of advanced modernity. For the Catholic faith claims a universality that 
reaches out to all things and draws them into one, and it is the university’s distinctive work to be 
the place in which the whole of reality can be studied and known in its integrity. In both of these 
phenomena, and especially in their synthesis, MacIntyre sees a salve for what ails late modern 
society. And indeed, in earlier eras, “it was one of the works of the Catholic faith, and more 
especially of Catholic education, to provide within just such milieus an integrative vision of the 
human and natural orders, as well as of the supernatural order, one that could inform not only 
education, but the subsequent lives of the educated, by providing them with a standard for 
identifying and criticizing the inadequacies of the social orders that they inhabited.”17 But the 
contemporary Catholic university suffers no less than its secular counterparts from the negative 
effects of unbalanced specialization that threaten its coherence and from the cultural trend of 
compartmentalization that drives an artificial wedge between the spheres of life and thought. It 
will be of no help whatsoever, then, if a university that functions according to the prevailing 
model is run by a Catholic entity, even if this means that there are ample opportunities for faith 
development and that “a significant proportion of the practitioners of the specialized disciplines 
                                               
16 MacIntyre, 16. 
17 MacIntyre, 16. 
 52 
happen also to be Catholics.”18 Such institutions cannot provide the kind of integration that alone 
makes academic enquiry, and finally human life, coherent. Rather, on account of the dominant 
logic of compartmentalization, they amount to nothing more than “a place where the activities of 
a secular university and Catholic religious practice happen to coexist within a single 
institution.”19 It may indeed be the case in such universities that “the question would often arise 
for particular individual faculty members of how their faith relates to their academic studies and 
teaching, and enterprises designed to pursue this question would recurrently flourish.” But to the 
extent that the institution as a corporate body fails to ask and answer the question in a robust 
way, “such enterprises would necessarily be marginal to the projects that would be in practice 
treated as central to the life of such universities.”20 The problem of compartmentalization, which 
undermines the coherence of the university, does not admit of partial, indeed compartmentalized, 
solutions. 
Philosophy, Theology, and the Order of Things 
 
The practical question of how to undertake a reform of the university is distinct from, but 
dependent upon, a prior theoretical question: what the university is in its essence. In his account, 
MacIntyre closely follows that of John Henry Newman, who set forth his views on the matter in 
response to a different sort of practical necessity. In 1851, the Catholic bishops of Ireland had 
asked the former Oxford don, not to reform a university, but to found a new one for Catholics, 
who were then excluded from the state-sponsored institutions of higher learning. In a series of 
ten public lectures delivered in Dublin in May and June of 1852, Newman carefully laid out the 
essential parameters for the new university. But he did so in a way that indicated quite clearly the 
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universal terms in which he understood his task. Having been charged with creating a Catholic 
university, he nevertheless set out in the lectures to define what “a University [is] in its essence,” 
a way of framing the topic eventually reflected in the title of the published form of the lectures, 
The Idea of a University.21 For Newman took all universities, regardless of the circumstances of 
their founding, to be “place[s] of teaching universal knowledge.”22 This meant, first of all, that 
their principal function was the instruction of students rather than the discovery of new 
knowledge, something proper instead to academies and research institutes. But it also meant that 
the object of their teaching was “intellectual, not moral.” If its object were “religious training,” 
explained Newman, “I do not see how it can be the seat of literature and science.”23  
Given this position, it may come as a surprise that Newman spends the first three 
discourses following the introduction discussing the vital place of theology in the university. The 
first of those discourses, though, makes clear the logical consistency of his argument. There he 
seeks to establish on the basis of reason alone that theology is not merely “religious training,” 
but constitutes a branch of knowledge. What then does Newman mean by theology? Without 
prejudice to the reasonableness of revelation, which he upholds, Newman nevertheless proposes 
to consider the theology proper to the university first of all in a much more limited sense.24 It 
does not, therefore, concern the doctrine of the Catholic Church, nor the sorting out of 
interdenominational polemics, nor even the study of Scripture, much less religious 
interpretations of the physical world.25 “I simply mean,” says Newman, “the Science of God, or 
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the truths we know about God put into system; just as we have a science of the stars, and call it 
astronomy, or of the crust of the earth, and call it geology.”26 What he has in mind more or less is 
that dimension of philosophical thought traditionally called “Natural Theology,” 27 which 
employs logical reasoning not only to prove the existence of the one God but also to specify the 
divine attributes that necessarily follow, amplifying this account only slightly by attributing to 
God both the act of creation and an ongoing providence.28 It should be uncontroversial, he 
argues, that a field of study defined by such a scope and method constitutes a science and thus 
belongs in the university no less than any other. “I speak of one idea unfolded in its just 
proportions, carried out upon an intelligible method, and issuing in necessary and immutable 
results.”29 
In the effort perhaps to avoid all association with religion and its long history of sparking 
controversy and conflict, some universities had already begun to marginalize theology or even 
exclude it altogether by Newman’s day. It was impossible to do so, however, without 
undermining not only the identity of the university as a place concerned with universal 
knowledge but also its practical capacity to fulfill that role. In an argument that MacIntyre would 
largely adopt and develop further a century and a half later, Newman explained the web of 
connections among disciplines on which the coherence of the university was based. The first step 
is to recognize that the universe, which the university purports to study, is one. “I lay it down,” 
says Newman, “that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject-matter is one; for the 
universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together, that we cannot separate off 
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portion from portion, and operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction.”30 Though 
God is not a being in the universe, but rather the source of all being, study of this source is itself 
essential to the process of understanding and a constitutive part of it. Even if “Theology has its 
departments towards which human knowledge has no relations” because it extends beyond what 
is knowable by reason alone, “we cannot truly or fully contemplate [the universe] without in 
some main aspects contemplating [God].”31 Having thus established that theology is an essential 
science alongside the others ordered to the study of the universe, Newman goes on to argue that 
the individual sciences presuppose and depend upon all of the others, claiming that they fall or 
stand together. “As [all sciences] belong to one and the same circle of objects, they are one and 
all connected together; as they are but aspects of things, they are severally incomplete in their 
relation to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and for their own respective 
purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other.”32 But perhaps someone 
will still object that theology ought to be excluded from the sciences because of the invisibility of 
its subject matter and the highly speculative nature of its method. If one opts for that line of 
argument, says Newman, the whole of the university will fall like a house of cards, built as it is 
on the conviction that reason can proceed according to different modes proper to its object. “If 
the knowledge of the Creator is in a different order from knowledge of the creature,” Newman 
explains, “so, in like manner, metaphysical science is in a different order from physical, physics 
from history, history from ethics. You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of 
secular knowledge if you begin the mutilation with divine.”33  
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This defense of theology’s place in the university, which can only be characterized as 
minimalist, nevertheless points to what Newman sees as the pinnacle of the university’s work 
and thus its highest possibility. It is worth following Newman’s analysis this one step further, 
since it also forms the central move of MacIntyre’s argument. Newman has already sought to 
establish the interdependence of the sciences. Now he proposes to show that the highest 
possibility of the university and the mark of true education is the ability to see the various 
sciences for the genuine whole that they form and to bring the universal perspective to bear on 
the consideration of any given particular. Such integration is possible only because there is a 
master science capable of performing the task: “the comprehension of the bearings of one 
science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment 
and due appreciation of them all…belongs…to a sort of science of sciences, which is my own 
conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of the word, and of a philosophical 
habit of mind.”34 The reason Newman feels compelled to qualify his definition of philosophy in 
such personal terms is that, already by nineteenth century, the general movement toward 
disciplinary specialization had combined with philosophy’s own internal developments in the 
previous two centuries to narrow dramatically the scope of academic philosophy. Newman 
wished to recapture an earlier sense of philosophy’s open horizon, indeed its all-encompassing 
role as the place of synthesis of human knowledge. Such philosophical integration is the end to 
which all the various enquiries of the university are ordered and the ultimate goal of education. 
“That only is true enlargement of mind,” says Newman, “which is the power of viewing many 
things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal 
system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. This 
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is that form of Universal Knowledge…set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its 
perfection.”35  
In this account of the university and the centrality Newman accords to philosophy, 
MacIntyre finds a coherent statement of both the multifarious tasks of the university and what 
serves to integrate them as a true whole. It is a whole which, while existing in reality, is made 
present to the human person only through the work of reason, that is to say, through the process 
of logical extrapolation. The various fragments that constitute the immediate content of sense 
experience are made intelligible in the first place through the particular mode of investigation 
proper to the nature of the object. As MacIntyre explains, “Each [science] is a representation of 
some aspect of reality and it is as the mind grasps how each plays its part that the mind advances 
toward that comprehension of the whole that it is the end of the human mind, by its nature, to 
achieve.”36 But this further movement toward more comprehensive intelligibility is possible only 
by means of higher level abstraction, as reason in the mode of philosophy serves to integrate the 
various fragments of knowledge. “It is beyond the power of the human mind,” MacIntyre notes, 
“to grasp the universe as a whole, even inadequately, except through first understanding the 
parts, and so we abstract, for our intellectual attention, the different parts of the whole… We 
move toward a philosophical understanding as we grasp the relationship of each science to the 
others and the distinctive contributions that each makes to the understanding of the whole.”37 
But which philosophy is equal to such a task? Here MacIntyre proposes to go beyond 
Newman, whom he finds unable to supply an answer to the problem so clearly and correctly 
delineated. “[I]f Newman had succeeded to some significant degree in defining the tasks 
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confronting Catholic philosophy,” remarks MacIntyre, “it was evident that the philosophical 
resources for carrying out those tasks still had to be identified.”38 The most that Newman could 
say, somewhat unusually for his age, was that Aristotle remained a definitive point of reference. 
“While we are men,” so he claims in the fifth of his lectures on the university, “we cannot help, 
to a great extent, being Aristotelians.”39 MacIntyre does not disagree. For Christians, however, 
the decisive encounter with Aristotle had already occurred some six centuries earlier when his 
works were first translated into Latin, sparking first controversy and then fruitful engagement 
among the scholastics of the University of Paris. Among the achievements of that era, the 
philosophical synthesis of Thomas Aquinas has unique and enduring relevance according to 
MacIntyre, a status aptly reflected in magisterial documents that treat it as the philosophia 
perennis.40 By the time of Newman, Thomas had long fallen out of favor and would only begin 
to return to prominence at the turn of the twentieth century. But why, in MacIntyre’s estimation, 
is the work of Thomas so significant? It unites the integrative power of Aristotle’s 
comprehensive philosophical framework with the insights that come from Christian revelation, 
insights that are capable of being investigated by reason but which cannot be discovered in the 
first place through the operation of reason. In this way, Thomas indicates a more ample place for 
theology in the pursuit of universal knowledge than Aristotle, exceeding even the relatively 
modest place assigned it by Newman. As MacIntyre explains, Aquinas “transcended the 
limitations of Aristotelian modes of thought and recognized conceptual possibilities that were 
unknown and alien to the philosophers of the ancient world. It is here that Aquinas’ theology is 
important. Without that theology he would not have been able to ask some of the key 
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philosophical questions he addressed” such as “what reason we have to assert that the God who 
reveals himself exists, how it is that human beings are directed by their nature to an end beyond 
nature” and how God’s omnipotence is consistent with finite beings’ “independent powers of 
causal agency.”41  
As this comment suggests, MacIntyre still regards philosophy as the central axis of 
Thomas’ thought, even if it is assisted in the performance of its function by insights drawn from 
theology. It is no surprise, then, that he applies the same framework to the university. While 
theology has an irreplaceable role to play, it is nonetheless philosophy above all that is 
responsible for the critical work of integration. “In Catholic universities,” says MacIntyre, “this 
integrative task is understood as having an essential theological dimension. But the integrative 
task is nonetheless a task for secular reason and a task for the secular university and to abandon it 
is to endanger the functioning of universities as universities, rather than as mere assemblages of 
assorted disciplinary enterprises.”42 As a sort of temporary concession, therefore, MacIntyre is 
willing to leave to one side the question of whether theology in some form is essential to the 
coherent operation of every university, undoubtedly on account of how much more foreign even 
than in Newman’s era the suggestion has become. Indeed, many Catholic universities have 
followed their secular counterparts in creating department of religious studies in place of, and to 
the exclusion of, theology. It nonetheless remains the case that, even in universities with a robust 
commitment to theology, the task of integration is one for reason, and thus for philosophy. It is 
only philosophy, in MacIntyre’s estimation, that has the capacity to show “what bearing each of 
[the disciplines] has on the others and how each contributes to an overall understanding of the 
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nature of things.”43 Where theology is present, as it should be, “it would be a central task of 
philosophy in such a university to enquire into the nature of the relationship between theology 
and the secular disciplines.”44 Philosophy, that is, continues to operate in the same way. In the 
latter case, it simply has more complete matter to work with, relating theology to the secular 
disciplines and not merely such disciplines to each other. 
On the question of how precisely theology relates to the various disciplines, MacIntyre’s 
account remains rather vague. That the goal of perfected understanding requires the integration 
of the theological perspective is clear. As MacIntyre notes, “education in physics or history or 
economics remains incomplete until it is to some degree illuminated by philosophical enquiry, 
and all education, including…philosophical education, is incomplete until it is illuminated by 
theologically grounded insight.”45 The picture becomes only marginally clearer when MacIntyre 
introduces the classic distinction between nature and grace to explicate the contributions proper 
to philosophy and theology. “What theology has to respond to in the first instance,” he writes, 
“are the incompleteness and the limitations of a purely philosophical view of the order of things: 
it has to show us nature from the standpoint of grace.”46 MacIntyre, of course, is himself a 
philosopher and not a theologian. So perhaps he can be forgiven for not saying more about grace. 
But if theology plays such a vital role in both the teaching and research functions of the 
university, it would seem that MacIntyre ought to provide, at the very least, an account of the 
central features of grace. What is the content of the Christian revelation that proves so decisive to 
our perception of the world and its order?  
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MacIntyre ends up opting for a more modest account of theology’s role, one that notably 
returns to the precincts of philosophy, albeit a theistic philosophy. And this is consistent with his 
claim that the religious philosophy of Thomas Aquinas provides the essential framework for the 
coherence of universal knowledge. There are two elements of MacIntyre’s argument in favor of 
the relevance of theology. “First, it is only through the relationships of the different parts of and 
aspects of the universe to God that its unity and intelligibility can be adequately grasped.”47 For 
proof of this claim, he turns to the earliest, and quite possibly most significant, of Thomas’ 
contributions: the real distinction between essence and existence. In brief, both essence (what it 
is) and existence (that it is) can be predicated of all extant beings. But the fact that we can also 
understand essences apart from actual existence indicates that the two are not identical among 
finite beings. There are many finite beings that might exist but do not in fact, or that have existed 
but no longer do. The existence of such beings therefore requires reference to a cause outside of 
themselves. But even an extended chain of similar beings will not be enough to discover their 
first cause, because an infinite regress results. There must therefore be, at the head of the chain of 
causality, some being that is its own cause. The essence of such a being is necessarily identical to 
its existence. It is Existence itself. And this is what the Scriptures reveal the God of Israel to be. 
Thus, every investigation of finite being in the university implicitly relies on this foundational 
discovery of philosophy that finds confirmation in theology. “No matter how far scientific 
explanation is taken, the existence of whatever it is that exists and its having the characteristics 
that it has remain surd facts, yet to be made intelligible,” explains MacIntyre. “What kind of 
agency would have to be identified to make them finally intelligible? It would have to be such 
that it itself, its existence and nature, require no further explanation, that is, that there is no 
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question of existence having been conferred on its essence, something ruled out only if what it is 
and that it is are one and the same, that it is a being whose essence and existence are identical. 
But this is how theists conceive of God.”48 
MacIntyre’s second argument for the relevance of theology to the project of universal 
knowledge rests on the unique status of human beings in the universe. “[T]he unity of the human 
being and the nature of human beings,” he argues, “also requires a theistic perspective for its full 
comprehension.”49 If this sounds at first like an abandonment of cosmology as the point of 
integration in favor of anthropology, MacIntyre makes clear that the two fundamentally coincide. 
The order of all things in the universe finds particular expression in the human being, who is 
uniquely capable of self-reflective cognition and thus in a certain sense sums up the whole 
cosmos in himself. As he explains “any adequate account of what it is to be a human being will 
explain how and why human beings are capable of the relevant kind of self-knowledge. Such an 
account will have to integrate what we can learn about the nature and constitution of human 
beings from physicists, chemists, and biologists, historians, economists, and sociologists, with 
the kind of understanding of human beings that only theology can afford.”50 Theology, it seems, 
lends its own evidence of the unique status of human beings to what can be discovered by the 
secular sciences. In addition to its substantive content, the very nature of theology as an 
existential pursuit serves a critical function in the university as a reminder of both the possibility 
and importance of subjective appropriation, not merely objective acquisition, of knowledge. “It 
is not just that Catholic theology has its own distinctive answers to” fundamental questions, says 
MacIntyre, “but that we can learn from it a way of addressing those questions, not just as 
                                               
48 MacIntyre, 77. 
49 MacIntyre, 175. 
50 MacIntyre, 177. 
 63 
theoretical inquiries, but as questions with practical import for our lives, asked by those who are 
open to God’s self-revelation.”51 
There is, then, an important role for theology in the pursuit of perfected understanding. 
But it remains dependent on philosophy, and not just because of the practical marginalization or 
even exclusion of theology from the late modern university and intellectual life. Its dependence 
on philosophy, in other words, is not accidental but essential, owing to the nature of the two 
disciplines. While theology is concerned with realities both knowable by reason alone and those 
that exceed reason, the whole realm of what is knowable by the human intellect constitutes 
philosophy’s province. To it alone therefore ultimately falls the critical work of synthesis, even 
as it engages both theology and the secular sciences in the process. From this perspective, 
MacIntyre’s proposed reform of undergraduate education—the necessary prerequisite to the 
reform of the university as a whole—logically follows. He envisions a tripartite curriculum with 
each part corresponding to the three realities that comprise the experience of the human person: 
the physical world (mathematics and natural science), one’s own cultural heritage (history of 
ideas in socio-political and economic contexts), and the need to come to terms with cultures 
radically different from one’s own (linguistic and literary studies). “All three have a 
philosophical component: philosophy of mind and body, the philosophical questions raised by 
different aspects of our past history, the interpretive and evaluative questions posed by our 
relationship to other cultures.”52 Thus it is philosophy that must guide the enquiries in each part 
of the curriculum and reveal their interconnections so that students emerge with a clear sense of 
how they form a genuine whole. Only after three such years of integrated study would it then be 
possible for students to proceed to professional training or specialized research. Nor would 
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MacIntyre stop there. For coherence to be restored to the university, “we would have to reform 
all our Ph.D. programs by adding to them both a theological and a philosophical dimension, so 
that the training of future college and university teachers is informed by the same integrative 
perspective that is required in undergraduate education.”53 And to combat the ills of 
compartmentalization, the university must find ways of encouraging that “what goes on in the 
classroom provides a leaven for student conversation in every area” of university life, though 
MacIntyre does not specify how it might do so.54 Perhaps a revised curriculum that emphasized 
integration above all would itself go a long way to accomplishing this end.  
 
The Incompleteness of Perfected Understanding 
 
With MacIntyre’s account, have we thus arrived at a genuine whole: the perfected 
understanding of the order of things that results from the philosophically integrated pursuit of 
manifold enquiries? There are objections of both a practical and a theoretical nature that indicate 
we have not. While the theoretical objections are more serious, indicating as they do the logical 
inadequacies internal to the argument itself, the practical ones are also worth mentioning, since 
the solution we seek cannot remain in the realm of theory alone if it is to satisfy the concrete 
longing for a whole capable of integrating the fragments of human life.  
There are three practical objections, two of which MacIntyre himself acknowledges. To 
begin, then, with the one that MacIntyre does not himself flag: his proposed undergraduate 
curriculum suggests that all members of the university must first and foremost be trained as 
philosophers and only secondarily as practitioners of the various disciplines. In order, that is, to 
achieve the kind of philosophical integration such a curriculum envisions, the level of 
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philosophical sophistication required would be equal to that of what today we would consider a 
major in the field. But weighting the course of studies so heavily in the direction of philosophy 
necessarily constrains the ability of students to develop the levels of expertise in other fields 
required for them to understand precisely the matter proper to those fields that is to be integrated 
into the overall scheme. Perhaps MacIntyre would reply that such expertise will come later, after 
the groundwork of philosophy has been laid. But then one confronts a further practical difficulty: 
that the philosophical integration of disciplines as diverse as subatomic physics and medieval 
French literature must occur at such a high level of abstraction as to have minimal practical 
effect on the pursuit of those disciplines.  
A second practical objection is the sheer lack of will for reform, above all in secular 
universities, but even in Catholic ones. As MacIntyre himself notes, “the structures of the 
contemporary research university are…deeply inimical to such projects. So that any Catholic 
university in which such projects were to be successfully pursued would need to have structures 
and goals very different from those of the great secular research universities.”55 Experience 
suggests that, far from such a willingness to strike out in bold new directions, Catholic 
universities are more prone to follow the lead of their secular peers, especially those intent on 
competing with prestigious secular institutions for the same pool of students and faculty. A 
further practical objection constitutes the most serious of the three. Even if one could specify a 
curriculum that successfully balanced philosophical training with that of other disciplines and 
had the will to implement it, the state of academic philosophy itself is riven by such radical 
divisions that even the most basic concepts have become essentially contested. Shortly after 
MacIntyre made the transition from Marxist philosopher to Thomist, and thus long before he 
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explicitly took up the question of the state of the university, the problem of rival traditions in 
philosophy came to occupy a central place in his work. Already in 1981 in the study for which he 
is probably best known, After Virtue, his conclusion points toward alternative and 
incommensurate traditions which force a choice for philosophy.56 MacIntyre went on in 1988 to 
choose for the topic of his Gifford Lectures precisely this problem of rival versions of moral 
enquiry that have become practically unable to engage each other and that thus require deliberate 
structures that promote productive confrontation. In a move that perhaps portended his late 
career reflections on the university, MacIntyre dedicated his final lecture to “reconceiving the 
university as an institution.”57 Anticipating the central theme of his later work, he notes: “Insofar 
as the curriculum, both in respect of enquiry and in respect of teaching, is no longer a whole, 
there can be no question of providing a rational justification for the continued existence and 
flourishing of that whole, of the university as the whole that it once was.”58 With philosophy 
itself marked by such fundamental divisions, the only way forward was to make the university 
into a place in which regular and deliberate clashes between the traditions might occur. “[T]he 
contemporary university,” MacIntyre concludes, “can perhaps only defend that in itself which 
makes it genuinely a university by admitting these conflicts to a central place both in its 
enquiries and in its teaching curriculum.”59 But if this is indeed the state of the university, how 
can MacIntyre’s envisioned curriculum be realized without the institution itself necessarily 
breaking into smaller units in which philosophical consensus may be found? 
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The theoretical objections to MacIntyre’s argument are more serious still. They can also 
be stated more succinctly, since they concern the order of logical reasoning rather than 
contingent circumstance. Can we indeed speak of “the order of things” as a meaningful whole, as 
MacIntyre proposes to do? Philosophical reason is quite capable of illuminating the relations 
between the various sciences and thus of extrapolating from fragments of knowledge to an 
increasingly adequate picture of the whole of finite being. But as MacIntyre himself insists, the 
operation of each particular science and the intelligibility of all finite being ultimately depends 
on its relation to the infinite, uncaused source of being. There is very little that philosophical 
reason can say about that being, forced to confine itself to a few modest statements of an 
apophatic nature. As a result, at the very center of any cosmological synthesis of which 
philosophy is capable there stands a gaping hole analogous to the oculus of the Pantheon, an 
image of which fittingly appears on the cover of MacIntyre’s book on the university. The whole 
structure rises in perfectly ordered harmony, culminating at its peak in a void which in no way 
belongs to the structure itself. Even if the mind can in some way complete the arc by way of 
invisible lines extending along the trajectory it traces out below, it remains the case that the 
make-up of the pinnacle is incommensurate with the remainder of the dome. MacIntyre is of 
course well aware of the lack of proportionality between finite and infinite being. “To understand 
pebbles, cabbages, tigers and angels is to understand what they are, to grasp their essential 
properties. But God is beyond our understanding. We cannot have the kind of knowledge of him 
that we have of finite beings, and this at least in part is because we cannot apply to him the 
distinction between essence and existence.”60 But this necessarily implies that we cannot speak 
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of the order of things as if it were a whole, since it does not meaningfully account for God, the 
condition of its possibility. 
This objection, which highlights philosophy’s own limits as a discipline, points to 
another. The limits of philosophy are coextensive with the limits of human intellect. Thus it 
would seem that, if there is a mode by which the human person may come into relation to that 
whole which exceeds the limits of finite being, it will not be the human intellect, the operation of 
which is confined to finite propositions. But this is just as well, because our own human 
experience suggests that objective knowledge alone does not constitute a whole, as if it were 
enough merely to know some set of objects, however extensive. Rather it is the operation of 
subjectivity that makes objects into a meaningful whole, one which points to and gives 
expression to the freedom characteristic of personhood. This was Nietzsche’s fundamental 
insight: that will, and not merely intellect, is what accounts for the whole. Because, however, he 
identified this will with the finite human will, he concluded that the whole must consist in 
culture, which shapes the fragments of Nature into a synthesis that transcends the natural. Even 
so, his work reflects a telling ambivalence about the capacity of the finite human will to produce 
such a synthesis, resorting as he does to vague invocations of the metaphysical origins of the 
genius, which also fails to explain how the existing order in Nature makes such a synthesis 
possible. Confronting his account with that of MacIntyre opens up the view to a third possibility: 
that divine freedom, which is itself the source of order in the universe, is also what finally forms 
its various fragments into a genuine whole. But to speak of divine freedom is to enter 
unambiguously into the realm of theology, not as a backdrop for the work of philosophy but as 
the central locus of integration. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Whole in Fragment: 
 
Balthasar and the Perception of God’s Glory 
 
 
 
 
 In our search for the whole, two well-honed critiques of the university have served to 
clarify the path along which we may, and may not, reasonably hope to discover something that 
gathers into a unity the various fragments of the world. For if such a thing is to be found 
anywhere, the university would seem to be a more likely place in which to discover it, since 
teaching and research are oriented in principle to the whole of being. To the extent that the 
university has fallen short of this native aspiration, critiques such as those of Nietzsche and 
MacIntyre indicate the direction in which the more complete fulfillment of its mission may lie, 
together with the point of integration that such a mission implies. Nor are the two particular 
critiques we have considered here utterly singular and idiosyncratic. Rather their great value lies 
in the exemplary way that they pursue to the utmost limit the logic of two characteristic 
operations of the human person: reason and will. Thus in Nietzsche’s account of the unifying 
possibilities of culture, we see the limits of human action in general, including alternative 
accounts that might emphasize, for example, social justice or classical liberalism instead. And in 
MacIntyre’s account of philosophy’s integrative role, we see the limits of all human thought, 
which always leaves an unexplained remainder, since even philosophy can ultimately explain 
only essences and not existence. 
 The unfinished character of both proposed syntheses suggest that full and final 
integration can lie only at a more fundamental level, and thus theology. Joseph Ratzinger has 
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said as much. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that the university as we know it in the West 
owes its very origins to the advent of Christianity and its theology. “For the university came into 
being,” claims Ratzinger, “because faith declared the search for the truth to be possible and 
urged believers to participate in that search, which then in turn demanded a broadening of its 
scope to include all levels of human knowledge and thus brought forth the various faculties, 
which nevertheless were all held together, despite the variety of their respective subjects, by their 
common subordination to the question of truth, the possibility of which, as they all knew, was 
guaranteed by the faculty of theology.”1 What precisely was so revolutionary about Christian 
theology that it could spark such a development? Ratzinger points to the foundational claim of 
Christology, already evident in the Gospel of John, that in the person of Jesus, the whole of the 
divine Logos is present. The implications of such a claim are two-fold: first, that the source and 
origin of all being accords with human reason even if its infinite dimensions exceed the limits of 
human thought, and second, that the human person is able to come into contact with this infinite 
reality in Jesus. “When the Gospel of John names Christ the Logos…[it] expresses the 
conviction that what is reasonable, indeed, fundamental reason itself, comes to light in the 
Christian faith; it means to say that the very foundation of being is reason.”2  
In principle, such a theology should be able to reveal what makes a whole of the 
fragments not just of the university but of the universe, where culture and philosophy have failed 
to do so. But this does not bring our enquiry to an end, because it is precisely at this point that 
the problem of fragmentation can at last appear in all its radicality, revealing inherent obstacles 
to the integration of all things. At issue is not merely the practical problem that theology has 
                                               
1 Joseph Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2008), 151. 
2 Ratzinger, 148. 
 71 
been marginalized in, and even in large part expelled from, the modern university.3 More to the 
point are the changes that academic theology has undergone in order to conform to the norms of 
modern epistemology. To avoid expulsion from the academy, theology has learned that it “can 
retreat into a thoroughgoing professionalism and thus prove that it completely measures up to the 
canon of positivistic reason. In this way it attains the same rank as the other specialized 
disciplines of scholarship.”4 But even this historical contingency is merely a reflection of the 
underlying and abiding tension that uniquely characterizes Christian theology. For it is the claim 
of Christianity that God communicates his infinite Word to the finite human person in Jesus. 
Theology, therefore, is not first of all man’s speech about God, but God’s direct address to man. 
How can the finite being recognize such communication as divine, since it must necessarily take 
the form of his own finite categories? And even should he be able to recognize it as such, how 
can he then reflect on and represent what has been communicated to him without reducing it to 
his own measure, effectively destroying it in the process? In this context, the limitations of 
human thought and action, which in their own spheres proved unable to effect a synthesis of all 
things, suddenly seem to threaten theology’s capacity to do the same. If what God seeks to 
communicate to the creature must necessarily be reduced to the measure of human thought and 
action, then it is bound to remain fragmented even in its highest forms of realization as religious 
philosophy and Christian culture. As Hans Urs von Balthasar notes, “In philosophy, man 
discovers what is humanly knowable about the depths of being; in existence, man lives out what 
is humanly livable. But Christianity disappears the moment it allows itself to be dissolved into a 
                                               
3 Ratzinger highlight this fact, as does MacIntyre. Ratzinger, 151; MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, 
Universities, 175. 
4 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, 152. 
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transcendental precondition of human self-understanding in thinking or living, knowledge or 
deed.”5 
To come into relation to the whole that God wishes to communicate to his creature thus 
requires the exercise of a capacity beyond just the will and the intellect. For, only a capacity that 
enables an encounter with the other precisely as other, without simultaneously reducing it to 
one’s self, will be adequate for the integral exchange between the infinite and the finite. But this, 
notes Balthasar, is just what occurs in the “aesthetic sphere…a third, irreducible realm next to 
that of thought and action.”6 In the act of perception (αἴσθησις), even that which exceeds the 
understanding and the abilities of the beholder is made present to him in its integrity. In 
principle, therefore, it also has the power of attuning him with ever greater precision to those 
aspects of its form that initially escape his grasp. It is on account of this double effect that 
Balthasar understands the aesthetic as the decisive juncture for theology, the vital entry point 
through which God can expand man’s limited horizons to the infinite measure of his own. And 
what is there, above all, to see in this divine horizon? Love. This is the astonishing revelation 
made visible in Jesus Christ: that God is Love. It is the essential property of divine love to give 
itself over to the other in total abandonment, establishing unity in difference. And it is on account 
of this unifying force that we can at last speak in earnest of catholicity, of the gathering up of all 
the fragments of the world into a genuine whole. As Balthasar sets out to explain, God’s love 
accomplishes this great act in a way perfectly suited to the nature of his creature, revealing his 
love in the flesh, the Whole discernible precisely in the fragment.7 
 
                                               
5 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 51. 
6 Balthasar, 52. 
7 “The Whole in Fragment” is the literal translation of the title Das Ganze im Fragment, Balthasar’s book 
that treats the problem of time and the fragmentariness of existence. Hans Urs von Balthasar, A 
Theological Anthropology (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967). 
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Seeing the Form: Theological Aesthetics 
 
 If God does in fact will to communicate his own divine unity to the world, and thus to 
draw its many fragments into one, then this act cannot be anticipated in advance. The matter lies 
entirely in the realm of divine freedom. There can be no question, then, of stipulating from the 
outset on the basis of a priori reasoning what form such unity might take. In this way, a properly 
theological account of the whole will necessarily differ in kind, and not just in degree, from those 
that emerge from the realms of human action and human thought. Accounts of unity according to 
these two inner worldly modes take as their starting point a particular method and set of 
premises, from which logically follows a set of steps that will have to be pursued if the stated 
aim is to be accomplished. If, by contrast, God elects to act in favor of the world’s unity, the 
divine event must first come to pass before it can be recognized as such. But how, in that case, 
can it be recognized at all? What human faculty could possibly be equal to the task of detecting 
divine action in the world? 
 The existence of the Christian faith is itself evidence of an answer to the conundrum. 
Uniquely among world religions both before and since, the disciples of Jesus came to recognize 
in a human person the fullness of the divinity. God appeared in flesh—an affirmation so 
foundational to the Christian faith that it belongs to the Scriptural witness and not merely to the 
theological writings of a later age. “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us,” says John 
in the prologue of his gospel. “We have beheld his glory.” (Jn 1:14) Over the course of the 
centuries, the Christological paradox at the heart of this mystery has prompted unending 
theological reflection, and with good reason. How indeed can God take on flesh? How can such 
incommensurate natures be brought into union, and what is the balance between them? Far less 
attention, however, has been paid to the equally astonishing implications of the second clause, 
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perhaps on account of a tendency to see it as a mere extension of the mystery. But how is it that 
John and the other disciples “beheld his glory,” that they perceived in the man Jesus not merely 
the radiance of human excellence but “glory as of the only-begotten Son from the Father”? In 
what way is the human faculty of perception capable of such an object, which is so out of 
proportion with things in the created order? That God should take on flesh is one thing, but that 
man should be able to perceive God precisely in the flesh is quite another. And the latter of the 
two mysteries grows only greater when it becomes clear that the former is in some way ordered 
to the latter.8 It is no mere byproduct of the Incarnation that man should behold God’s glory but 
precisely an end for which God acted in taking on flesh. He wished to appear, confident that 
man’s power of perception was ultimately equal to the sight. 
Of all the evangelists, John is particularly emphatic about the point. As in his gospel, so 
too do the opening lines of his first letter underscore the act of perception as foundational: “That 
which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which 
we have looked upon and touched with our hands, concerning the word of life—the life was 
made manifest, and we saw it, and testify to it, and proclaim to you the eternal life which was 
with the Father and was made manifest to us—that which we have seen and heard we proclaim 
also to you.” (1 Jn 1:1-3) It is equally evident in the gospel accounts that a great many people see 
nothing more in Jesus than an unlettered man from the countryside: “How is it that this man has 
learning when he has never studied?” (Jn 7:15) The crowds press in on him, but few reach out in 
the conviction that “[i]f I touch even his garments, I shall be made well.” (Mk 5:28) So hidden is 
his divinity by the unexpected form in which it appears that Jesus can say from the Cross, 
                                               
8 For the consummate early expression of this mystery in the tradition, see Irenaeus of Lyon, Against the 
Heresies: Book III, trans. Dominic J. Unger and Matthew C. Steenberg, Ancient Christian Writers 64 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1992), chaps. 11, 16, 19, 22. 
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“Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.” (Lk 23:34; cf. 1 Cor 2:7-8) And yet, 
John in particular is also aware of numerous encounters in which someone is led from not 
perceiving the divine depths of the man Jesus to perceiving it. The dramatic pattern, which is 
already evident at the beginning of Jesus’ ministry in his dialogue with the woman at the well (Jn 
4:1-42), reaches its most iconic expression in the healing of the man born blind, which places the 
granting of physical sight in parallel with the spiritual recognition of Jesus as the “light of the 
world.” (Jn 9:5) At first, the blind man knows only that the one who enabled him to gain his 
sight, whom he did not see physically, was “the man called Jesus.” (9:11) Later, in the face of 
questions by those who insist that Jesus is not from God because he heals on the sabbath, the 
man is able to go further: “He is a prophet.” (9:17) Finally, after ever more strident debate with 
the Pharisees, he once again encounters Jesus, whom he is able to see physically for the first 
time. But with Jesus’ help, he will now profess to see even more. Does he believe in the Son of 
man, asks Jesus. His answer betrays a disposition of readiness and receptivity: “And who is he, 
sir, that I may believe in him?” (9:36) At this, the divine word rings out in the intimate cadences 
of a human voice: “You have seen him, and it is he who speaks to you.” (9:37; cf. 4:26) “Lord,” 
he says, “I believe.” (9:38) 
 If we have come to associate theology above all with an act of the intellect seeking to 
make sense of the data of revelation, it is a vital corrective to recall that God’s communication to 
man, and thus theology in its most proper sense (ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ), belongs rather to the realm 
of perception. As Balthasar points out, this essential fact of revelation is also, therefore, the 
inescapable starting point and enduring foundation of all theology in its secondary and derivative 
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sense as human reflection on God’s action in Christ.9 Theology thus involves a certain asceticism 
from the outset, since there is a natural counter-tendency to refer phenomena straightaway to the 
forum of the intellect and the will, where the initiative lies squarely with man to convert what he 
has seen into knowledge or a program of action. “The temptation to reach conclusions,” notes 
Balthasar, “is particularly strong… If one cannot produce satisfactory research results here, then 
why should he write anything?”10 Instead, if theology is to correspond to the nature of its object, 
it will have to adopt the mode proper to perception, namely unconditional receptivity, even if 
such a state and way of proceeding is initially uncomfortable. It will have to attend to the original 
phenomenon, which is no less paradoxical than the Christological mystery itself. “The Apostles 
were transported by what they saw, heard, and touched—by everything manifested in form,” 
observes Balthasar. They “never tire of describing in ever new ways how Jesus’ figure stands out 
in his encounters and conversations; how, as the contours of his uniqueness emerge, suddenly 
and in an indescribable manner the ray of the Unconditional breaks through, casting a person 
down to adoration and transforming him into a believer and a follower.”11 
Such an encounter in the order of grace is possible only because of the structure of the 
natural order, upon which, as Thomas tells us, grace builds.12 To appreciate, therefore, how the 
faculty of perception is capable of mediating the encounter with the divine, we must pay 
attention to the operation of aesthetics in the order of nature. This is not to suggest by any means 
that the kind of perception made possible in the order of grace is simply continuous with the 
                                               
9 “‘[T]heological aesthetic’,” he argues, “far from being a negligible and dispensable by-product of 
theological thought, cannot but lay claim to the center of theology as the only valid approach.” Balthasar, 
Love Alone Is Credible, 11. 
10 Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, ix. 
11 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Seeing the Form, ed. Joseph Fessio and John Riches, trans. Erasmo Leiva-
Merikakis, 2nd ed., vol. 1, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2009), 32. 
12 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, a. 1, q. 8, ad. 2. 
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natural operation of the faculty. The orders of grace and nature must be distinguished, and it is 
for this reason that Balthasar is always careful to speak of the “aesthetic analogy”13 and not of 
aesthetics tout court: “Nowhere does theological aesthetics descend to the level of an inner-
worldly aesthetics.”14 The analogy of being remains the essential reference point for 
understanding the relation between nature and grace. But this principle, which reaffirms with the 
Fourth Lateran Council that there is in tanta similitudine major dissimilitudo, also implies that a 
genuine similitude does nonetheless obtain between the two.15 And what we find in the natural 
realm is that the most proper object of perception is not merely a mass of sense impressions but a 
coherent form or figure (in Balthasar’s usage, Gestalt). While made up of constituent parts, a 
form represents an irreducible whole; and while having an outward appearance, it also seems to 
point to an unseen reality that stands behind the form and constitutes its unity. As Balthasar 
explains, “We are confronted simultaneously with both the figure and that which shines forth 
from the figure… [W]e are brought face to face with both interiority and its communication, the 
soul and its body, free discourse governed by laws and clarity of language.”16  
Some ages have shown a keener appreciation of this extraordinary feature of perception 
than others. The classical world could hardly restrain its appetite for ever more instantiations of 
beautiful forms, convinced that in them one could glimpse something of the invisible. Thus at the 
headwaters of Western thought it was already possible for the act of natural perception to take on 
a proto-theological orientation. We find the fullest articulation of this intuition in the Symposium, 
a dialogue that dates to the middle period of Plato’s corpus but which came to be considered 
something of the final word of his philosophy since it identifies man’s ultimate state of 
                                               
13 Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 1:475. 
14 Balthasar, 1:407. 
15 See Balthasar, 1:449. 
16 Balthasar, 1:20. 
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happiness, indeed the point to which all of existence is ordered. That state consists in the rapt 
beholding of the One, the Good beyond all worldly being which draws the beholder to itself by 
radiating its unparalleled beauty. But the journey to this exalted state begins with the humblest of 
experiences, one so narrow and particular as to seem antithetical to the divine horizon: youthful 
infatuation. The experience of perceiving the beauty of the beloved can be so overwhelming that 
the young lover imagines he has already discovered the heart of all existence. When, however, he 
encounters an entirely different form, the beauty of which similarly moves him, he begins to 
realize that particular instantiations of beauty do not exhaust all the many forms it can take. From 
this point on, he will be able to seek after beauty in whatever form it is to be found, his ability to 
perceive it growing ever more refined in the process: from bodies to customs and from customs 
to theories. “This,” says the philosopher Diotima to a young Socrates, “is what it is to go aright, 
or be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes upward for the sake of this Beauty, 
starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs…so that in the end he comes 
to know just what it is to be beautiful.”17 What it is to be beautiful in an unconditional and 
infinite way, it seems to Plato, must be a single form that accounts for all the partial 
instantiations of beauty in the finite world. Thus even the lover who is drawn to beauty in its 
lowliest form will not be satisfied until he reaches Beauty itself. “There if anywhere should a 
person live his life, beholding that Beauty,” says Diotima. “[I]f he could see the divine Beauty 
itself in its one form, do you think it would be a poor life for a human being to look there and 
behold it?” No, concludes Diotima, “if any human being could become immortal, it would be 
he.”18  
                                               
17 Plato, Symposium, trans. Paul Woodruff and Alexander Nehamas (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), secs. 
211c–211d. 
18 Plato, secs. 211d–212a. 
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 We can leave to one side the obvious ways in which this exercise in philosophical 
aesthetics departs from the theological phenomenon described in the foundational texts of 
Christianity. In Plato’s understanding, for example, the attainment of ultimate unity can only 
mean a flight from the world: the whole realm of multiplicity must be left behind. And the love 
that drives the entire movement is found exclusively on the side of the finite human person. Two 
features of Plato’s account, however, provide lively insight into the operation of the aesthetic 
faculty which indicate why it is uniquely suited to the encounter of the human with the divine. 
First, unlike the intellect and the will, the reach of which are limited to the measure of an agent’s 
own abilities, the power of perception enables an agent to come into contact with a reality that 
entirely surpasses his own limitations. If the lover in Diotima’s schematic is first drawn by the 
beauty of a form well within the scope of his own experience, by the end he finds himself 
absorbed in the contemplation of something of a different order altogether. Is such a possibility 
purely mythological? For proof, says Balthasar, one need only think of our experience of hearing 
a great work of music. “What we encounter in such an experience is as overwhelming as a 
miracle, something we will never get over. And yet it possesses its intelligibility precisely as a 
miracle.”19 That is to say, we simultaneously experience it as something that lies outside our 
capacity for invention and yet nevertheless has a definite plausibility about it. The second feature 
of the aesthetic that Plato’s account brings to light is it susceptibility to attunement. In what 
Diotima imagines as an ascent from lower forms of beauty to higher ones, the lover’s ability to 
discern beauty grows ever more perfect precisely in the process of being exposed to his object in 
different forms. If the human person is to detect God present and active in the world, it is 
similarly true that he will have to develop an “ ‘eye for quality’…analogous to the eye of the 
                                               
19 Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, 52–53. 
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connoisseur which can infallibly distinguish art from kitsch.”20 Indeed, the capacity of the 
aesthetic to be honed by exposure to its object proves all the more critical in the theological 
realm, since the object in such a case is by definition utterly unique. For man to recognize God in 
Christ, the eye for this phenomenon will have to be “bestowed along with the phenomenon 
itself.”21 And in such a case, the incomparability of the figure of Christ provides precisely the 
measure for its recognition. “This discernment is but the perception of the manner in which the 
God-given form distinguishes and sets itself apart from all others.”22 
 Taking stock, then, we can now see that if God elects to draw the world into his own 
divine unity, he will have to communicate infinite fullness to the finite creature. And this seems, 
in principle, impossible. “A whole symphony,” as Balthasar colorfully puts it, “cannot be 
recorded on a tape that is too short.”23 But the aesthetic, the human faculty essentially ordered to 
receptivity, is in fact well-suited to the operation. This is so not because the finite human faculty 
is itself capable of the infinite. It plainly is not. “[T]he image of Christ cannot be ‘taken in’ as 
can a painting; its dimensions are objectively infinite, and no finite spirit can traverse them.”24 
There can be no question, then, of the receptive human faculty reaching the ‘end’ of the infinite 
phenomenon and thus of containing the whole within itself. Such a state would necessarily entail 
the end of receptivity too, but the suitability of the aesthetic as the forum of divine self-
communication lies precisely in its essentially receptive modality. Even so, perception alone will 
not be enough. The will and the intellect too will be required, first to welcome, and then to make 
sense of, the sign of God. As such, both the will and the intellect will have to come to share in 
                                               
20 Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 1:468. 
21 Balthasar, 1:468. 
22 Balthasar, 1:469. 
23 Balthasar, 1:499. 
24 Balthasar, 1:499. 
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the essentially receptive orientation of the aesthetic. “The prerequisite for sighting the form of 
Jesus is faith in God, in the very general sense that a person must make space for divine 
omnipotence—all the space that this form needs in order to unfold fully.”25 It is for this reason 
that the theme of receptivity echoes through the prologue of John’s gospel like the refrain of a 
Greek chorus drawing our attention to the central dramatic tension of the Christ event: “He came 
to his own home, and his people received him not” (Jn 1:11); “But to all who received him…he 
gave power to become children of God” (1:12); “And from his fullness have we all received, 
grace upon grace” (1:16). But in what form does this fullness appear? In what does it consist? To 
this we now turn. 
The Form of the God-Man 
 
Any attempt to articulate the form of Christ immediately runs up against an intrinsic 
difficulty of which even the gospel writers are aware, perhaps especially so. “[W]ere every one 
of the [things Jesus did] to be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books 
that would be written.” (Jn 21:25) Fittingly, this is the final word of the fourth (and final) 
gospel—a kind of open-ended non-conclusion and one which has a characteristically playful and 
childlike air about it. Balthasar, who like Georges Rouault on canvas, tried to catch a glimpse of 
the face of Christ in the numerous literary portraits he penned, is also aware of the difficulty.26 
“Scripture witnesses that the letter cannot keep pace with the fullness of Christ in its attempt to 
express it.”27 The most one can do at any one time, then, is to give careful attention to a discrete 
set of salient features that emerge in the gospel narratives, confident that these and countless 
others converge on the one same divine ‘I.’ As Balthasar notes, “We shall never be in a position 
                                               
25 Balthasar, 1:499. 
26 Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, 50. 
27 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Truth Is Symphonic: Aspects of Christian Pluralism (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1987), 35. 
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to encapsulate the mystery of this ‘I’, with its nearness and its distance, in a concept or a 
formula, for at its heart lies the mystery of the relationship between God, the Absolute, and man, 
the relative.”28   
Given the distinctive role John’s gospel plays in theological aesthetics according to 
Balthasar, we can perhaps take our bearings once again from his prologue. There he summarizes 
the whole phenomenon of Christ as a radiance of glory, “glory as of the only-begotten Son from 
the Father.” (Jn 1:14) It is a curious formulation, and its strangeness is not easily resolved by 
understanding it simply as indicating a theophany, though it certainly does that too. Rather, it 
draws attention precisely to the fact of Jesus’ being a Son from all eternity. That Jesus referred to 
God as his Father is clear in all of the gospels; and that he himself wishes to be understood as 
Son is also well-attested, though in the synoptics the phrases “Son of man” and “Son of God” 
(cf. Mt 16:16; 26:63) are more prominent as ways that he refers to himself and others to him. 
Jesus’ reference to himself as “the Son” is most typical of John’s narrative, although it does 
appear in a highly significant passage common to Matthew and Luke: “All things have been 
delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows 
the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.” (Mt 11:27; Lk 
10:22)  
One aspect of this phenomenon is especially noteworthy on Balthasar’s telling. In what is 
a mark of its incomparable nature, the form of the Son has a certain stereoscopic quality to it. As 
Jesus says repeatedly and in a variety of ways, “He who has seen me has seen the Father.” (Jn 
14:9) The irreducible strangeness of this transparent form, as it were, continues to challenge even 
his closest disciples to the end of his earthly life. At the Last Supper, even Philip, who readily 
                                               
28 Balthasar, 28. 
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recognized Jesus as the Messiah at their first encounter (1:49), struggles to grasp that Jesus 
reveals the Father in his very self. “Lord,” says Philip, “show us the Father, and we shall be 
satisfied.” (14:8) How easy it is to understand the disciples’ confusion. It is not immediately 
obvious in the order of nature how a form can communicate not only itself but also an other. But 
this is precisely what characterizes the form of Christ, the revelation of which will also disclose a 
possibility latent in the created order. As Balthasar observes, “He is what he expresses—namely, 
God—but he is not whom he expresses—namely, the Father. This incomparable paradox stands 
as the fountainhead of the Christian aesthetic, and therefore of all aesthetics!”29 Jesus does not 
merely leave his disciples before a bald assertion, but rather indicates in his statements about 
himself how this surprising state of affairs is possible. His entire life is marked by a not doing 
and a not having: “I can do nothing on my own authority…I seek not my own will.” (5:30) This 
negation, however, is not the mark of a pure passivity, but of the most active receptivity and 
cooperation. He has his own genuine ‘I’ which is not only distinct from that of the Father but 
which also rings out with all the authority of the divinity. Thus he can say, “My Father is 
working still, and I am working” (5:17), but also, “When you have lifted up the Son of man, then 
you will know that I am he” (8:28), applying to himself the divine name. In this light, it becomes 
clear that the negations that are so prominent in Jesus’ statements about himself are at the service 
of a positive end: that the Father and his will might appear in the world through the Son’s 
making that will his own.  
The receptivity which is characteristic of the Son is not limited to the forum of the will, 
however. Everything the Son has and is he receives from the Father, including life itself. “I live 
because of the Father” (Jn 6:57), says Jesus, for “as the Father has life in himself, so he has 
                                               
29 Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 1:29. (emphasis original) 
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granted the Son also to have life in himself.” (5:26) In addition to the Father’s will and the works  
he gives the Son to perform (14:10), the Son also receives from him words (3:34), teaching 
(7:16), glory (8:54), and fundamentally his love (3:35). In his revelation of the Father, therefore, 
the Son also reveals what is distinctive of his own person. As Balthasar explains, “The Son’s 
form of existence, which makes him the Son from all eternity (17:5), is the uninterrupted 
reception of everything that he is, of his very self, from the Father.”30 It is for this reason that 
John can sum up the whole mystery of Christ in terms of the all-embracing glory of his being a 
Son. For the revelation of receptivity in the very heart of the Godhead reaches out to every other 
aspect of the divine mystery.  
Christ’s divine sonship also reveals the meaning of the created order, as indeed it must if 
creaturely being can be assumed by the eternal Son. In light of the eternally uninterrupted act of 
the Son’s generation from the Father, the multiplicity of the finite world suddenly appears as a 
positive work of Providence rather than a threat to the ultimate unity of all things. Indeed, as 
Balthasar sets out to explain, eyes trained by the contemplation of the Son will be able to see in 
the apparent fragmentariness of the world an image of eternity. To see how this is so, one can 
begin with the feature of the created world that seems to sum up in itself the very essence of 
finitude, that is, time. One of the primary ways we speak of the distinction between the realms of 
created and uncreated being is precisely in terms of time and eternity, and fittingly so, since the 
essential limitedness of all finite things is nowhere made more manifest than in the inexorable 
passage of time. If anything renders the created order a series of fragments, it is this. But the Son 
eternally receives his being from the Father in a ceaseless act of generation. He is pure 
receptivity. “Now it is his receptivity to everything that comes to him from the Father that is the 
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 85 
basis of time and temporality,” says Balthasar.31 Far from being antithetical to the integral and 
eternal being of God, time is a fitting and indeed most remarkable image of the perpetual 
openness of the divine Son to receive from the Father the whole that he wills to communicate. “It 
expresses, clearly and precisely, the fact that the Son in eternity makes nothing his own in any 
way that contradicts its being given to him, continually, ceaselessly, by the Father.”32 Such an 
affirmation in no way threatens to conflate the distinct realities of created and uncreated being or 
to project a worldly phenomenon onto eternity. Time is an image of eternity, not the other way 
around. But to the extent that it is genuinely an image, the analogy obtains. And the power of this 
analogy, this real likeness between the Creator and his creation, appears most clearly in the 
earthly life of the eternal Son which reveals the meaning of created order. What his life reveals 
about time, the fundamental constituent of this order, is that it has the meaning of love, as 
intimate exchange between Father and Son. “[H]is possession and experience in this world of 
that which is his own,” explains Balthasar, “is going to be, not all in one flash, but something 
received by him, and hence continually offered up to him, given back to him and again received 
as yet another new gift of love.”33  
 The only thing that renders time fragmentary is sin, a reality completely alien to the Son 
and to the plan of creation. “God intended man to have all good, but in his, God’s, time,” 
observes Balthasar.34 Thus the first account of creation in Genesis carefully marks the passage of 
time, but always in relation to the orderly unfolding of the many good things God prepares as 
gifts for the human person (cf. Gen 1:29-30). The second account of creation, in a distinct but 
complementary way, conveys a blissful lack of awareness of the passage of time, calling 
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attention to it only when God warns the man and woman against a future possibility: “when you 
eat from [the tree of knowledge of good and evil] you will die.” (Gen 2:17) In the end, the 
alternative picture that the serpent paints of the future proves too enticing: “when you eat of it 
your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods.” (Gen 3:5) Sin always has this character as a 
breaking out of time and an anticipating by our own efforts the good that God wishes to give us. 
“[W]e sin,” notes Balthasar, “in order to arrogate to ourselves a sort of eternity, to ‘take the long 
view’ and ‘make sure of things’.”35 But in laying claim to eternity and to godlike status, the finite 
creature has in view only his limited horizon and invariably chooses some limited good in place 
of the fullness prepared for him by God. He prefers the part to the whole. His sin thus renders the 
finite world, the original meaning of which is streaming openness to God, into a series of 
incommensurate shards.  
 The Son suffers the contradictions of sin “to the end” (Jn 13:1), giving new proof in time 
of his eternal love for the Father. Since he does this as a human person, he also gives new proof 
of man’s love for God and shows his brothers and sisters from within their own vantage point 
how to love God. It is for this reason that the fourth gospel understands the whole earthly life of 
the Son as oriented toward his “hour” (cf. 2:4; 7:6; 7:30; 8:20; 12:23,27; 13:1; 16:21,32; 17:1), 
which is also the decisive hour for all mankind (4:23; cf. 5:25,28). If man has treated passing 
time as a container to fill as he pleases, the Son goes to the Cross under the strictest obedience to 
the Father so that time might once again be filled with his love. “[A]s it grows toward 
fulfillment,” therefore, the time of the Son’s earthly life “assumes into itself the growing 
emptiness and desolation of the unreal time of sin…not only in order to know it and having 
known it to overcome it, but in order to fill it with valid meaning.”36 All the contradictions of sin 
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amass in force at the Cross, the place where the earthly form of the Son is threatened with 
disfigurement to the point of erasure. And thus it is precisely there that the Son, who lets himself 
be led to that point by the Father, can lead mankind out of the place of brokenness and 
fragmentation. In enduring the clash of all the particular and incommensurate standpoints, the 
Son reveals “the most active readiness…to step in, according to the Father’s will, on behalf of 
every individual. In this way, he does not overcome the particular from outside, but, 
acknowledging what is relatively valid in it, leads it beyond itself from within.”37  
The reduction of his bodily form to a state of formlessness in the process is itself a 
revelation. It recalls the extraordinary event which set his whole life on earth in motion, when, as 
Balthasar puts it, the Son “in seed-like nothingness let himself be implanted in the Mother’s 
womb by the Holy Spirit, ready and open for every wish that came from the Father.”38 The 
Christ hymn that Paul cites in his letter to the Philippians is evidence of the fact that Christians 
had already begun to contemplate this mystery from the earliest days of the Church. “Christ 
Jesus,” so they sang, “though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing 
to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of 
men.” (Phil 2:5-7) But that is not all. Having thus let go of his form once before, he did so again 
in accepting the formlessness of death. “And being found in human form he humbled himself 
and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross.” (2:8) On the day of his resurrection, it 
at last becomes possible to see that this perpetual readiness to submit to formlessness is what 
makes possible the gift of eternal life to the sinful creature. It also, therefore, becomes the 
characteristic sign of his boundless love, which stops at nothing to gather all things into one. 
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This, then, is the glory of the Son: that he so receives his being from the Father as to stand in a 
state of perpetual openness to whatever the Father proposes in whatever form it may take. This 
glory grows only more radiant when it begins to dawn that, in thus revealing the inner divine life 
to us, he also reveals the intimate state into which we as creatures are invited. 
 
Catholicity between Form and Formlessness 
 
 Our search for the whole thus finds its surprising resolution here in the figure of Christ. 
The readiness to accept every form from the Father as it comes is the participation in the divine 
fullness that is proper to the creature: the Whole communicated precisely in parts. It is this 
relationship to the divine totality that Jesus embodies, models, and makes possible in his 
unlimited availability to receive whatever the Father wishes to give him and to take on 
whichever form of life in which the Father wishes to institute him. In him and in the way that he 
opens to the Father, it at last becomes possible to speak of catholicity—of a genuine orientation 
of all parts to the whole—without an asterisk indicating unresolved questions, such as those that 
surround the metaphysical origins of Nietzsche’s genius and philosophy’s inability to account in 
a meaningful way for the existence of the essences it interrelates. But this means that the 
foundations of catholicity lie neither in the intellect nor in a positive act of the will but in a prior 
disposition—indeed, the very receptivity characteristic of the eternal Son, who even in his 
earthly mission let himself be led entirely by the Father. As Balthasar notes, “He did not have a 
plan of work neatly drawn up but harkened to the inner voice, with an overflowing desire to 
receive and carry out the Father’s instructions,” a disposition already evident in the most striking 
of ways in the act of the Incarnation itself.39 In his embrace of the formlessness of the womb, we 
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see to what degree his life is marked by “an in-difference, a lack of distinction, consisting of pure 
readiness for God.”40 
Indifference, then, is the enduring foundation of Christ’s orientation to the whole and thus 
of those who seek to follow him along the way. But this state of readiness, which is characterized 
by a fundamental lack of form, is ordered precisely to the taking on of definite form, according 
to what God should desire at any given point. It is in this act of being formed into something 
quite definite and particular that the individual creature receives an integral place in the divine 
totality. As Balthasar explains, the “superordinate reality can so inform a subordinate plurality 
that the latter is lifted up into the former’s unity without being robbed of its distinctive 
character.”41 In the case of the human person, who is possessed of a free will, such a principle 
takes on the special character of an election, a free choice to embrace that which God proposes. 
By choosing what God offers him to choose, the person receives a place in “a whole that 
transforms his particularities into ministries.”42 Paradoxically, rather than finding his freedom 
limited by such a state, “in a way that exceeds all hope, each of his freedoms finds itself in a 
broad space where, released from all narrowness, it can make its personal contribution to the 
whole on the basis of the equally personal Spirit of the Whole.”43 That is, he will discover 
precisely in his particular task and form of life a view to that totality in which God incorporates 
him, which does not however mean that he somehow acquires a kind of superhuman oversight of 
the whole that allows him to float above the particularities, and indeed real difficulties, of the 
place in which he has been placed. Quite to the contrary, a person so instituted will at last be in a 
position to experience the enormous weight of the resistance to divine love under which the 
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created world labors, without seeking to give himself an escape. Having spoken his Yes to God 
in a quite unlimited way, he will let himself be led where he does not spontaneously prefer to go 
(cf. Jn 21:18) “If God increases his demands,” says Balthasar, “if the path becomes steeper and 
harder (until it reaches the foot of the cross), the original Yes expands.”44 Such an expansion in 
the face of trial is possible only because a strict and abiding obedience, an echo in the life of the 
disciple of the pure and uncompromising obedience of the Son which is revealed above all at the 
Cross. 
Indifference, election, obedience. These three elements constitute the drama of catholicity 
in the life of the creature, who is brought into relation to the divine whole along the way opened 
by the Son. But these are also the central pillars of the Ignatian Exercises. And so it is no surprise 
that Balthasar should have dedicated his book on catholicity to the ‘pilgrim’ saint who learned to 
‘find God in all things’ in his contemplation of the figure of Christ. It was his development of a 
profound theological aesthetic that enabled Ignatius in turn to teach others how to discern the call 
of “the Eternal King, before whom is assembled the whole world” and whose summons goes 
forth “to all…and to each one in particular.”45 The grace one prays for in the Exercises “not to be 
deaf to his call, but prompt and diligent to accomplish his most holy will” is not only 
foundational to the life of Christian discipleship but its permanent disposition.46 In a great 
oscillation between form and formless readiness, one must be perpetually listening for the call so 
as to be formed by it anew. “That person has the greatest freedom,” remarks Balthasar, “who can 
let go of his present form and allow himself to be regenerated in the formless origin, in the 
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nothingness of the seed-cell—his original vocation, which has always remained fresh!”47 It is 
just such a freedom that one encounters in the life of Ignatius and that accounts for his role in 
facilitating the formation of so many others—a “universal molder of men because he himself 
remained universally pliable.”48 Thus in retrospect it is no surprise that the Order he founded 
quickly became involved in education, even if such a mission was not immediately clear to him 
and his first companions. Nor is it difficult to see, in light of the encounter with Christ made 
possible by the Exercises, what inevitably became the most distinctive feature and integrating 
center of that education. Indeed, the catholicity of an education is still to be found where Ignatius 
and his first companions sought it: in the cultivation of a profound theological aesthetic, which 
alone is capable of perceiving the whole in the midst of fragments. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
A Sense for the Whole : 
 
Ignatius and the Founding Intuition of Jesuit Education 
 
 
 
 
One of the most extraordinary documents that survives from the earliest years of the 
Society of Jesus is also one that, until recently, has remained largely overlooked in the numerous 
studies of Jesuit education. It is the letter which Pierre Favre wrote in May 1541 to the first 
group of scholastics that Ignatius Loyola sent to the University of Paris to undertake the studies 
necessary to be fully incorporated into the Society.1 While Ignatius and the first companions had 
originally imagined that those joining the Society would, like them, have already acquired 
“sufficient learning” for the Order’s consueta ministeria, they quickly “found it a quite difficult 
matter to increase the numbers of this Society with such good and learned men.”2 They decided 
therefore to “take another path, that of admitting young men whose good habits of life and talent 
give hope that they will become both virtuous and learned in order to labor in the vineyard of 
Christ our Lord.”3 The group at Paris thus represented a vital experiment for the future of the 
Order and the first venture of the Society of Jesus into the field of education: the Society itself 
would see to it that these and other young men acquired the requisite learning. In what did such 
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learning consist? And is it possible to discern, already here at the origin of a long and storied 
educational tradition, “a specific Jesuit concept of education?”4 
The choice to send the young men to the University of Paris supplies part of the answer. 
The curriculum there remained firmly scholastic in content, with pride of place given to the 
philosophy of Aristotle and, at its apex, the theology of Thomas Aquinas and to a lesser extent 
Peter Lombard. Indeed, the Jesuit Constitutions would eventually identify “the scholastic 
doctrine of St. Thomas” as the one to be followed above all on account of its having been 
“deemed…more solid and safe.”5 At first glance, then, it might well seem as though Jesuit 
education began as a development wholly within scholasticism, and not a particularly innovative 
one at that. But even by the time the first companions had arrived in Paris a decade earlier, the 
University had already adopted certain practices developed in Renaissance humanist circles as 
well, including most notably the commitment to “an organized plan for the progress of the 
student through increasingly complex materials and a codification of pedagogical techniques 
designed to elicit active response from the learner.” 6 These features too became known as 
elements of the modus parisiensis, even if they owed their development in part to the activity of 
humanist figures outside of France.7 Renaissance humanism, in fact, would eventually prove 
even more influential in shaping Jesuit education than scholasticism once the Society opened its 
classrooms to non-Jesuit students, few of whom went beyond the foundational subjects of the 
studia humanitatis to study philosophy and theology.8 If scholastic content and, to a certain 
degree, method continued to structure studies at the highest levels, it is nevertheless the case that 
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“the fundamental humanistic philosophy of education…provided the Jesuits with the core values 
for their pedagogy,” especially in regard to the vast majority of students in their schools.9  
Once again, then, the question arises whether Jesuit education is not basically a derivative 
phenomenon. Does it represent at bottom an appropriation of existing educational ideals and 
methods, distinguished only by an innovative organizational effort that enabled their replication 
on the grand scale? If so, the story of Jesuit education may well be one of great historical and 
sociological interest but not of theological significance in the strict sense. It will have influenced 
the development of educational systems and perhaps even the course of history but not have 
disclosed for us new vistas of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ. 
Here is where Favre’s letter proves invaluable, pointing to the genuine theological novum 
at the heart of Jesuit education: the primacy it accords to theological aesthetics. Beyond sheer 
acquisition of knowledge and even beyond character development, the first Jesuits conceived 
education as finally ordered to the relishing of God’s glory made manifest above all in the Cross, 
which itself made possible a correct perception of God’s presence in all creaturely being. Favre 
encourages the scholastics to keep this perspective always in mind in the course of their studies, 
framing his letter at both beginning and end by reference to a key word that each of them would 
instantly have recognized as central to the Spiritual Exercises: in Spanish, “sentir,” and in Latin, 
“sentire.” Writing mostly in Spanish except when citing texts more commonly known to his 
readers in Latin, Favre announces the theme of his letter in terms of a “desire of mine and of the 
entire Society” that the scholastics “not extinguish the spirit of holy sensing [el espíritu del santo 
sentir] with the spirit of knowing [el espíritu del saber].”10 The word “sentir” is famously 
difficult to render in English owing to its multiple connotations, which include feeling, 
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perceiving, thinking, understanding, and sensing; and the two published English translations of 
the letter opt instead for a combination: “thinking and feeling.”11 But the context here makes 
clear that Favre is deliberately setting sentir in opposition to the specifically rational-intellectual 
operation saber, so reference to “thinking” perhaps muddies the waters. Favre is not encouraging 
the scholastics to cultivate a disposition of thinking as against knowing. (What would that even 
mean?) Rather he is reminding them of a dynamic from the Spiritual Exercises that would have 
been intimately familiar to them: after having considered something using the three powers of 
the soul (memory, intellect, and will), the exercitant refers it finally to the realm of the spiritual 
senses, which enables one to perceive more of the mystery than man’s reason can reduce to 
propositions.12 Indeed, the attuning of one’s natural senses to the supernatural reality of which 
they are also capable constitutes, after the election, the central drama of the Spiritual Exercises 
and is ordered to introducing the exercitant to a permanently new mode of being in the wake of 
the retreat. As Karl Rahner has noted, “No one who has really grasped Christ with his senses can 
be turned aside by anything else.”13 
We know from his Memoriale that, at the time he wrote this letter, Favre was actively 
engaged in giving the Exercises in Regensburg, as indeed he did throughout his years of 
apostolic activity. He also continued to find much fruit in making meditations from the Spiritual 
Exercises himself, among them notably the one on “the five senses,”14 and found new strength 
“from the hand of the Holy Spirit” in the form of “more knowledge and feeling [sentimento]” in 
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his customary methods of prayer.15 But nothing gives so clear a picture of what Favre had in 
mind when exhorting the scholastics to maintain the spirit of holy sentir than a text from the 
Exercises that would have served as a daily reference point for him in his apostolic work: 
Annotation #2. In this instruction, the director of the exercises is encouraged to keep his 
explanations to the exercitant as concise as possible. “The reason for this,” as the annotation 
explains, “is that when one in meditating takes the solid foundation of facts, and goes over it and 
reflects on it for himself, he may find something that makes them a little clearer… Now this 
produces greater spiritual relish [gustus] and fruit than if one in giving the Exercises had 
explained and developed the meaning at great length.” This remarkable and innovative insight is 
then stated in the form of a principle: “For it is not much knowledge that fills and satisfies the 
soul, but the intimate understanding and relish [sentire ac gustare interne] of the truth.”16 A 
more literal translation, which would render the key phrase as “interior sensing and tasting,” 
makes even clearer the way the contrast at issue in Annotation #2 parallels exactly the 
construction that Favre uses in his letter to the scholastics. Indeed, it appears as though Faber 
may even have intended to quote, or at least paraphrase, the Exercises in the closing line of his 
letter, in which he prays, “May our Lord grant us to sense him [sentire de eo] in the love of God 
and the passion of Christ.”17 
Favre’s experience in the apostolate had confirmed for him the necessity of cultivating a 
profound theological aesthetic over even the most thorough mastery of propositional logic. 
Working in the German lands at the height of tensions between Lutherans and Catholics, he had 
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witnessed the inability of scholastic style debate to settle the questions dividing Christians. As he 
told the Jesuit students in Paris, “Words and arguments no longer suffice to convince the people 
here.”18 What the Church needed was rather radiant witnesses to Christian life that would draw 
people to a more lively practice of the faith, from which position mutual agreement and 
understanding would more readily flow. For this reason, wrote Favre, the scholastics “would do 
well to urge the scholars in Paris to pursue the life-giving spirit of letters by means of a life that 
is visibly dedicated to Christ, if they are to win to the faith those who have fallen.”19 The 
commission has an almost breathtaking quality about it: that these students should have 
something not merely to receive from, but to transmit to, the scholastic doctors of the university. 
But of course this could be done only in the same spirit of humility which characterized the 
conviction itself. “With the world having reached such a state of unbelief,” wrote Favre, “what is 
needed are arguments of deeds and of blood; otherwise, things will only get worse and error will 
increase.”20  
With the benefit of another year and a half of experience in the apostolate, Favre would 
go on to articulate more fully in his Memoriale the ordering of operations already implicit in his 
letter to the scholastics, from aesthetics to ethics to logic. The insight is remarkable, because it 
runs precisely counter to the presumption of Favre’s age, and perhaps our own, that logic is the 
starting point, from which flows ethics, and at last (as if an afterthought) aesthetics. Favre came 
to his conclusion by reference to the negative example of the heretics, who professed to act on 
the basis of logical reasoning, but in whom Favre noted a prior change in the realm of ethics. “I 
began to realize,” writes Favre, “how those who abandon the Church begin by becoming more 
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and more lukewarm in the performance of the works and practices which correspond to the 
graces and different gifts of God.” The result of this change in practice is a loss of contact with 
the whole complex of external inputs that make up the Catholic communion and that make sense 
of the propositions of the faith. “As a consequence,” observes Favre, “they regard as negligible 
and worthless anything they do not recognize as having been acquired by their own judgment.” 
Even if their gaze is thus fixed on the realm of reason, their base of operation is in fact the 
ethical, as they “begin to cherish a will to seek after and found a faith based on their own 
personal judgment.” Reason becomes the servant of the individual will, but in a way that remains 
unconscious. “They look for reasons and examine them, each on its own account. They search 
both the Scriptures and interpretations of them, deciding themselves what meaning to adopt. 
Thus they put together their own faith—better called their opinions and their errors.”21 It was 
Favre’s developing sense of this fundamental dynamic that prompted him, already in 1541, to 
remind the Paris scholastics of the importance of cultivating not only a holy aesthetic but also the 
moral life. “If only we could reach the point where those who are so eager to build up the 
Catholic faith would also begin by their words and life to reconstruct and build up the fabric of 
morality—especially now, when mere learning is so ineffective against the heretics.”22 
His experience in the apostolate thus confirmed for Favre that knowledge of the truth 
depended on the integrity of one’s moral life, and that one is drawn to such a life in turn by the 
perception of its goodness. On the basis of this alone, one might have the impression that, for 
Favre, while the ability to perceive true beauty was foundational, knowledge nevertheless 
remained the highest possibility of the human person and that therefore the logical enjoyed a 
certain priority over the ethical and the aesthetic. Such a position would bring him solidly into 
                                               
21 Favre, 195 (MonFabri §218). 
22 Favre, 326. 
 99 
line with the scholastic doctors in Paris, distinguished only perhaps by his claim that the correct 
operation of the rational faculty depended on good order in the realms of the ethical and the 
aesthetic. But what is remarkable about Favre’s letter to the Jesuit students in Paris is the clear 
primacy he accords to a theological aesthetic, to which even the whole order of the logical must 
ultimately be referred. In such a framework, a well-trained aesthetic appears as both foundation 
and summit of human wisdom and thus of education.  
We see this paradigm at work in the practical method Favre proposes that the scholastics 
follow in their studies: to “have as [their] review tutor the supreme master and ultimate 
interpreter of learning…the Holy Spirit.”23 In what sense could this possibly qualify as a 
practical method? It sounds, especially to modern ears, like mere spiritualizing rhetoric. Inspiring 
perhaps and pious, but not at all practical. But when one understands the role a review tutor 
played in the University of Paris as well as the Biblical account of the Holy Spirit’s operation on 
which Favre draws, both the practicality and spiritual richness of his advice become clear. The 
Holy Spirit, writes Favre, is the one “in whom whatever is known is known well, and without 
whom, whoever knows anything does not yet know in the way he should know it [1 Cor 8:2].”24 
As the Biblical context here makes clear, consulting with the Holy Spirit in prayer is the 
guarantee that one knows something correctly, because He always supplies the definitive 
measure, which is love. “Knowledge puffs up,” explains St. Paul, “but love builds up.” (1 Cor 
8:1) Within the University of Paris, it was similarly the repetitor, or review tutor, that helped 
ensure that one had understood a lesson (lectio) correctly and could more surely retain it by 
reviewing its principal points. A student would typically meet with his review tutor for a 
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repetitio each night before praying Compline.25 In urging the Jesuit students to have the Holy 
Spirit as their review tutor, Favre was thus indicating that they should refer all their studies 
finally to God in prayer, asking him to provide the correct measure by which all was to be judged 
and understood. In this way they could be sure to “keep his spirit not only through the [sentir] of 
the will and the heart, but also by means of the knowledge of understanding.”26 Most strikingly, 
when Favre sums up once again his advice to the scholastics, he makes it clear that this act of 
holy sensing is to be done not only after a lesson but also before. “[W]hat I am asking of you in 
the Lord is that you always prepare your lessons through so great a teacher and later review them 
with him as well.”27 Referring all lessons to the Spirit would thus constitute the foundation and 
summit of their education. 
Origins: the Education of Ignatius 
 
Favre’s instruction to the Jesuit students in Paris ultimately traces its origins to the 
intense period of instruction that Ignatius himself received at the hands of the Spirit some two 
decades earlier in Manresa. In his autobiography, Ignatius describes that decisive year as a time 
in which “God was dealing with him in the same way a schoolteacher deals with a child while 
instructing him.”28 He goes on to relate five examples to illustrate the way in which God was 
teaching him, each of them centering on an experience in which mysteries of the faith were 
conveyed to him by means of his senses. It was a period in which Ignatius had become 
increasingly conscious of sensory experience and of the ways in which his spirit could be moved 
by it. Indeed, he begins the chapter on the year in Manresa by describing a phenomenon that 
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started to occur with great frequency at that time, how “in full daylight he saw a form in the air 
near him.”29 As with so many of these experiences, Ignatius finds himself at a loss to describe it 
with precision, belonging as they do more to the realm of perception than cognition. “He did not 
understand what it really was, but it somehow seemed to have the shape of a serpent and had 
many things that shone like eyes, but were not eyes.”30 What he was eminently aware of, though, 
was how much pleasure he took in gazing upon the form. It “gave him much consolation because 
it was exceedingly beautiful,”31 and “the more he looked upon it, the more his consolation 
increased.”32 The converse was also true. “[W]hen the object vanished he became 
disconsolate.”33  
It was not until Ignatius had experienced the fifth of the events he mentions that he finally 
realized that this vision was from the evil spirit. And it is of utmost significance how he came to 
this understanding: through the training of his senses to recognize true beauty. While pausing for 
a moment of rest on his way to make a devotional visit to a church, “the eyes of his 
understanding were opened, and though he saw no vision, he understood and perceived many 
things, numerous spiritual things as well as matters touching on faith and learning, and this was 
with an elucidation so bright that all these things seemed new to him.”34 The grace was so 
immense, reported Ignatius, that he felt sure he received more from God in that one moment than 
in the sum of all the other graces in his life. The key for our purposes is what happened next. 
“[H]e went to kneel before a cross…to give thanks to God, and there that vision appeared to 
him—the one that had appeared many times before and which he had never understood—that is, 
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the object…that seemed most beautiful to him, with its many eyes.”35 But suddenly, in 
juxtaposition to the cross, the definitive measure of beauty, he could at last perceive the truth 
about the object that had long fascinated him. “Kneeling before the cross, he noticed that the 
object was without the beautiful color it usually had, and distinctly understood, and felt the firm 
agreement of his will, that that was the evil spirit.”36 
This key moment marked the culmination of Ignatius’ instruction, but the four other 
examples he relates helps to complete the picture of “how God dealt with him” and how central a 
role sensory experience played in this education.37 He came to a more intimate understanding of 
the Holy Trinity, creation, the presence of Jesus in the Eucharist, and the humanity of the divine 
Son above all by receiving the grace of seeing or perceiving each of these mysteries, yet always 
in ways that exceeded his ability to explain. His perception of the Trinity illustrates how different 
senses intertwined with the act of understanding to produce an experience so powerful that it 
“remained with him for the rest of his life” and moved him to such a degree in the moment that 
“he sobbed so strongly that he could not control himself.”38 In what, then, did the experience 
consist? It seems to have begun by his puzzling over the mystery of how the three persons can in 
fact be one, something which necessarily exceeds the powers of reason. But an analogy from the 
realm of sound suddenly manifested a way in which three can be one, namely the notes of a 
chord. Ignatius recalls that he was just outside the Dominican church when this happened, 
leading one to wonder whether the physical sound of the organ might not have prompted what he 
then heard in a spiritual way. In any case, his description of the experience strikingly blends the 
modalities of reasoning, seeing, and hearing all together in a single event: “his understanding 
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was raised on high, so as to see the Most Holy Trinity under the aspect of three keys on a 
musical instrument.”39  
He similarly struggles to describe precisely how he experienced the other moments of 
illumination and to reduce their content to propositional terms. In relation to creation, “he 
seemed to see a white object with rays stemming from it, from which God made light.”40 In 
relation to the Eucharist, the elevation of the actual host during Mass provided the physical 
context in which “he saw with inward eyes…some white ray coming from above.”41 By contrast, 
the many times he “saw with inward eyes the humanity of Christ,” it seems to have been without 
any physical prompting but rather “appeared to him as a white body…[without] differentiation of 
members.”42 In all of these experiences, he forthrightly confesses that he does not know “how to 
explain these things” while also feeling certain “that God…imprinted [them] on his soul.”43 So 
certain was he of the reality and power of these experiences, in fact, that he recalls feeling at the 
time a bold conviction that remained with him ever after: “If there were no Scriptures to teach us 
these matters of faith, he would still resolve to die for them on the basis of what he had seen.”44 
 
The Spiritual Exercises as Schola Affectus 
 
“What he had seen,” as it turns out, was less important than that he had seen. And 
Ignatius seems to have understood this, assiduously keeping notes throughout his time in 
Manresa in “the book that he guardedly kept with him and that afforded him much 
consolation.”45 He would from time to time “jot down a few items” about methods of prayer in 
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which he had found fruit and about insights he was slowly accruing about the movement of 
various spirits and how to discern them.46 By 1526, a mere three years after his stay in Manresa, 
Ignatius was already proposing meditations to his fellow students and others in Alcalá, a practice 
he continued refining even as he repeatedly encountered resistance from Church censors. 
Ignatius recalls that, when suspicions at last came to a head in Salamanca, he submitted to a 
panel of Dominican judges “all his notes, which were the Exercises, for examination,”47 
indicating that he had already consolidated by then grosso modo the set of instructions for 
“explain[ing] to another the method and order of meditating and contemplating.”48 It was in this 
form that the education Ignatius had received in Manresa would be mediated to Pierre Favre and 
the other companions at the University of Paris whom he “won to God’s service through the 
Exercises.”49  
As this comment reveals, Ignatius understood the election of a state of life as the central 
drama of the Exercises. Indeed, the subtitle he gave the book indicates as much, specifying that 
“their purpose [is] the conquest of self and the regulation of one’s life in such a way that no 
decision is made under the influence of any inordinate attachment.”50 But the essential means by 
which such a choice may be made in true freedom and in a final way is the operation of the 
spiritual senses, which must be trained above all to conform to the “sensibility of Christ.”51 This 
attunement of the senses amounts in turn to the enduring legacy of the Exercises in the life of the 
exercitant, since long after the completion of the retreat, it is the use of these senses that enable 
the fruitful fulfillment of the exercitant’s mission in the world.  
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How then do the Exercises accomplish this honing of the senses? They do so, first of all, 
by employing the senses to construct the setting for prayer, with the result that meditation is no 
longer confined to the internal forum but rather leads the exercitant outside of himself into an 
encounter with the other, and indeed ultimately with the God who is Wholly Other. In the 
Exercises, prayer always occurs in a definite place, and as a prelude to the act of meditation 
itself, the exercitant must see this place. “When the contemplation or meditation is on something 
visible,” explains Ignatius, we must first “[see] in the imagination the material place where the 
object is that we wish to contemplate.”52 Indeed, so important is this composition of place to the 
act of meditation that, even when “the subject matter is not visible,” the exercitant must still 
endeavor to see a physical setting that corresponds to the tenor of the subject matter.53 Having 
thus gone outside of himself, the exercitant can now enter into a genuine encounter, and in the 
succession of such events from one meditation to the next, does not merely consider them with 
the intellect but comes into the very presence of actors making their choice for or against God. 
For this reason, Ignatius emphasizes in the prefatory annotations to the Exercises how important 
it is for the exercitant to keep in mind the intersubjective nature of key moments in the 
meditations: “when in acts of the will we address God our Lord or his saints either vocally or 
mentally, greater reverence is required on our part than when we use the intellect in reasoning.”54 
The senses not only make possible the Exercises’ fundamental dynamic of encounter, 
they also convey the central mystery of the Word-made-flesh according to the dimensions proper 
to it. If human reason struggles mightily to articulate an account of how flesh is capable of 
receiving the Word and of being assumed by him, the sensory powers of the flesh can 
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nevertheless provide vital conduits for the communication of that surplus of the Word which 
exceeds the limitations of a rational account. Thus at the end of most days of the Exercises, there 
is prescribed a meditation employing the “application of the senses.”55 In the three or four 
meditations earlier in the day, the exercitant will have employed discursive reasoning to consider 
what the actors are doing and to reflect on himself. But at the end of the day, the senses become 
the privileged means by which the exercitant enters into the same mystery. He seeks to “see the 
persons…hear what they are saying…smell the infinite fragrance and taste the infinite sweetness 
of the divinity…[and] apply the sense of touch, for example, by embracing and kissing the place 
where the persons stand or are seated.”56 In each case, the disposition of the exercitant remains 
highly active, but this activity is perhaps best described as an ardent cultivation of receptivity, 
owing to the inherently receptive quality of the senses, which cannot function except by being 
oriented outward in relation to the other. In this way, the exercitant strives for a streaming 
openness to the Word, “always taking care to draw some fruit.”57 This same posture is required 
of the exercitant even when he is required to go to that place devoid of the presence of God so as 
to sense precisely this absence in Hell: “to see…the souls enclosed, as it were, in bodies of fire,” 
“to hear the wailing…and blasphemies against Christ,” “with the sense of smell to perceive…the 
filth and corruption,” “to taste the bitterness of tears, sadness, and remorse,” and “with the sense 
of touch to feel the flames.”58 
The receptivity of the creature to a reality that is consonant with his reason, but that also 
exceeds its capacities, is also the basis for the vital role the senses play in the Exercises’ account 
of how to make an election. Indeed, according to Ignatius’ understanding, even when one must 
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make a choice on the basis of reason, one must nevertheless refer the matter to the spiritual 
senses in the sight of God at both the beginning and end of the process. This is because the “love 
that moves and causes one to choose must descend from above, that is, from the love of God;” 
otherwise, one might be unwittingly acting on the basis of some other love or attachment, which 
by definition is not properly ordered.59 Therefore, the process of choosing must begin with an act 
of perceiving: “before one chooses he should perceive that the greater or less attachment for the 
object of his choice is solely because of His Creator and Lord.”60 After having considered by the 
light of one’s reason what to do, one must refer the matter once again to the realm of the senses, 
asking God to confirm the decision by the perception one has of the movements in one’s own 
spirit. “After such a choice or decision,” explains Ignatius, “the one who has made it must turn 
with great diligence to prayer in the presence of God our Lord, and offer Him his choice that the 
Divine Majesty may deign to accept and confirm it if it is for His greater service and praise.”61 
This dynamic of referring all rational enquiry to God in prayer both at the beginning and end 
undoubtedly formed the background for Pierre Favre’s advice to the Paris scholastics to consult 
with the Holy Spirit about each of their lessons as one would with a review tutor, and to do so 
both before the lecture and afterwards. 
The Exercises’ school of the heart reaches its apex in the final meditation, which opens 
vast new horizons toward the ever greater God and simultaneously reveals his intimate closeness 
to his creatures. Employing the senses once again, the exercitant sees how God demonstrates his 
great love by giving the exercitant the whole created order in all its variety, and even more than 
that his very self in Jesus Christ.62 In a remarkable way, God dwells in each of these creatures by 
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constantly holding them in existence and by conferring on them the features proper to each one, 
with all of these excellences coming together in man.63 Even more remarkably, God labors “for 
me,” the exercitant, in all these creatures.64 And because the Creator also always exceeds the 
limitations of the created order, the exercitant must see how God transcends these very creatures 
to which he is intimately present.65  
Two features of this culminating meditation are significant for our investigation of the 
role of theological aesthetics in Jesuit education. First, it affirms that “sensation [sentire],” upon 
which so much in the Exercises depends, is a property which the human person shares in 
common with “the animals,” and is in fact the distinctive way in which God dwells in them.66 
What is distinctive of man, by contrast, is “understanding.” But it is also the case that man is the 
creature in which is summed up every class of excellence, as God “dwells in me and gives me 
being, life, sensation, intelligence.” While Ignatius can thus affirm the Aristotelian anthropology 
that he learned at university, he also manifests an ability to transcend it in the direction indicated 
by the Biblical understanding of the unity and integrity of man’s various properties. As Hans Urs 
von Balthasar points out, “The Bible locates man’s ‘essence’ not primarily in what distinguishes 
him from other existing beings, but in his concrete and indivisible wholeness.”67 In this way, 
even sensation can be a decisive means by which God can accomplish in man that which man 
alone among all the creatures is capable of, namely reception of the divine life that is 
communicated to him.  
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Second, what moves man to action is seeing how God himself acts. God has given ample 
proof of his love for the creature in giving, dwelling, and laboring in creation “for me,” because 
as the introductory note to the exercise indicates, “love ought to manifest itself in deeds rather 
than words.”68 But love elicits love. That is, as soon as the motive of the deed is seen properly 
for what it is, the love of the lover necessarily calls forth love in the beloved, resulting in “a 
mutual sharing of goods.”69 And so the final word of the Exercises is the prayer of self-offering 
of the exercitant, who wishes to be conformed entirely to that definitive form of being revealed 
to him in and by his “Creator and Lord.”70 As in the application of the senses that the exercitant 
has learned to employ in his meditations, so too here the action of the creature is marked 
fundamentally by a disposition of active receptivity. This disposition is made evident not only by 
the way in which the offering is made (“as one would do who is moved by great feeling [multo 
cum affectu]”)71 but also by the content of the offering itself, which expresses a readiness to be 
made an instrument for use by God (“All is yours, dispose of it wholly according to your 
will”).72 Having been trained to perceive the divine drama as it unfolds, all the exercitant’s acting 
and willing now take on the character of a response to what he has seen. And what he has seen 
above all is his Creator and Lord making a total gift of himself in all things, a movement that 
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reaches its climax in the Cross.73 Thus the exercitant asks “that filled with gratitude for all, I may 
in all things love and serve the Divine Majesty.”74 
 
Education’s Coherence (and Man’s) 
 
Do not extinguish “the spirit of holy sensing” with the “spirit of knowing,” wrote Pierre 
Favre to the Jesuit students in Paris. What finally is at stake in this exhortation? First of all, the 
very coherence of their education. What was to make sense of all the various aspects of their 
studies, its ultimate horizon? Was it an ever more comprehensive grasp of the truth? That was, 
after all, the answer supplied by Thomas and much of the scholastic tradition. But Renaissance 
humanism gave a different answer: education is above all ordered to ethical development, such 
that knowledge of the truth is oriented finally to personal appropriation of the good, which is 
itself manifested in action. The Jesuits proposed yet a third point of coherence, the beautiful, and 
in so doing achieved the inner synthesis of these two opposed traditions of education, 
incorporating and including them in a movement toward the place the Jesuits understood to be 
the definitive vocation of creatures: a simple gaze directed to their Creator and Lord who would 
himself draw them into his activity and disclose ever new horizons of his truth.  
Truth, goodness, and beauty. These are the transcendental properties of being which, 
together with unity, can be predicated of all that exists. And thus to conceive education in these 
terms necessarily implies a conviction about the coherence of man himself, an account of his 
ultimate end. At first glance, Thomas’ articulation of man’s final happiness appears highly 
consonant with the Jesuit account to the extent that it relies on the language of vision, but it 
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quickly becomes clear that the scholastic doctor can mean this only in an analogical sense. “Final 
and perfect happiness,” claims Thomas, “can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine 
Essence.”75 Despite the reference to seeing, what this amounts to is not so much a beholding of 
the ever greater glory of God as an act of the understanding, which is conventionally associated 
with vision in the sense of “in-sight.” The development of his argument makes this clear. He 
goes on to say, “If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, 
knows no more of God than ‘that He is’; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply 
the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet 
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very 
Essence of the First Cause.”76 For Thomas, then, man’s final happiness consists in an act of the 
understanding, which is indeed the only way one can ‘see’ an essence. One might well have 
asked the scholastics whether man’s happiness is thus destined to be forever suspended and 
finally unreachable, since the finite creature can never definitively comprehend the infinite God.  
In fairness, there already existed within the scholastic tradition itself an alternative 
account of man’s final happiness in the work of Bonaventure. For the great Franciscan doctor, 
who like Thomas taught for a time in Paris, the whole purpose of growth in wisdom is “that we 
become good.”77 And this development in goodness has a very particular trajectory. It is 
ultimately oriented, says Bonaventure, toward growth in love. As Joseph Ratzinger, who 
specialized in the thought of Bonaventure as a young theologian, explains, “for Saint 
Bonaventure the ultimate destiny of man is to love God, to encounter him, and to be united in his 
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and our love. For him, this is the most satisfactory definition of our happiness.”78 This alternative 
avenue within the scholastic tradition did not at last win the same scope of influence as the 
theology of Thomas. But in the context of the present study, it is nonetheless worthy of note how 
“the loftiest category for Saint Thomas is the true, whereas for Saint Bonaventure it is the 
good.”79 For it is precisely the question of which transcendental enjoys primacy that is at issue in 
the appearance of Jesuit education on the scene some three centuries later.  
In the hundred or so years leading up to that moment, the Renaissance humanists would 
similarly espouse the category of the good above all. But they did so not from within 
scholasticism as Bonaventure did, rather as a scathing critique from outside. The humanists, 
remarks Paul Grendler, “found the intellectual training inherited from the late Middle Ages 
inadequate and objectionable.”80 The clearest proof of this, they claimed, was the poor standard 
of Latinity produced by students trained in the ars dictaminis with its rule-based method 
characteristic of scholastic thought. Rather than the transmission of an impenetrable thicket of 
rules, a good education required exposure to great (especially Latin) literature from the classical 
age. For the humanists, what was at stake was not merely the quality of one’s prose, but the very 
ethos that radiated from the pages of the ancient texts and that constituted an education of its 
own. As John O’Malley has noted, they “believed that the style and content of the ancient Latin 
authors like Cicero and Virgil held the key for a cultural revival in which good literature and 
good morals would go hand in hand”81 and that, contrary to the scholastics, “the true aim of 
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education was not learning for its own sake but the formation of character, which is what the 
study of the best literature would produce.”82  
The Jesuits found much to praise in Renaissance humanism and the pedagogical approach 
it gave rise to, especially for the foundational stages of education that would eventually 
constitute the bread and butter of most Jesuit schools. But it is also important not to overstate the 
dependence of Jesuit education on humanist techniques, which the Society merely treated as a 
fruitful means to be incorporated into a broader educational vision with distinct foundational 
commitments. If the Society could affirm with humanism that the ethical, and not just the logical, 
was an essential element of education, it nevertheless accorded primacy to neither the good nor 
the true, but the beautiful. The point of coherence for education, as indeed for man himself, lay 
in a profound theological aesthetic, which alone had the capacity to bring the other two 
transcendentals into a unity. The letter of Pierre Favre gives us a glimpse at the dawn of Jesuit 
education of its striking ability and commitment to incorporate traditions that were in fact set in 
opposition to one another. For, Favre claims Thomas as an example of precisely the disposition 
of holy sentir that he exhorts the Jesuit students to cultivate. “Saint Thomas,” he tells them, “was 
eager not only to review in prayer his lessons in whatever science or area of learning he was 
studying, but even to go over them with his inmost teacher before going to hear them with other 
instructors.”83 The fact that key articles of the Summa sit uneasily with the Jesuit understanding 
of the primacy of theological aesthetics is beside the point here. What matters is that Favre and 
the early Society believed that the propositions of Thomas and scholasticism could in large part 
be saved.84 So too with humanism’s commitment to the study of letters. In the course of his own 
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schooling, confesses Favre, he (like the humanists) “thought it was enough for us to be taught the 
beginnings and the ends of letters and at the same time what kind of means they are in 
themselves.”85 But this meant only the need for recalibration in light of the true end, not the 
wholesale dismissal of the importance of literary studies. For then one could “grasp though the 
truth of letters the good that they teach.”86 
 
Conclusion: Reaping the Fruits of Ressourcement 
 
In the end, it is difficult to assess the effect of the Jesuits’ core educational innovation in 
a comprehensive way. For it was oriented from the beginning toward fruitfulness in a realm that 
goes mostly unseen. But the discovery of aesthetics as the essential point of coherence for 
education also seems to have produced much visible fruit in the effect it had on the ability of 
those thus educated to recognize the presence, and indeed glory, of the Creator in the vast range 
of creatures. It was this revelation, mediated especially by the culminating meditation of the 
Exercises, that enabled and inspired Jesuits and their students to venture untroubled to all corners 
of the earth and into all the realms of creaturely being. This included the cultivation of drama and 
music, for which Jesuit schools and apostolates became so renowned, but also intensive research 
in the sciences and profound engagement with non-European cultures.87 The fact that most 
students in most Jesuit schools never made the Exercises themselves is quite beside the point. It 
was enough for Jesuits who had cultivated a spirit of holy sentir to mediate to their students a 
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sense for the transparency to the Creator of any activity in which they were engaged.88 And 
indeed, this constitutes a permanently valid way of articulating the distinctive approach of Jesuit 
education: to train the natural senses to recognize manifestations of worldly glory so that they 
may be prepared to perceive in God’s self-emptying love the definitive measure of all glory, the 
source and final end of all creation.  
This is a demanding standard and one that was bound to be put to the test repeatedly over 
time. Indeed, Jesuit education is every bit as “exposed a peak” as the “steep and narrow charism 
given to Ignatius,” from which it derives.89 Already by the generalate of Claudio Acquaviva, the 
Society’s official Directorium for the Spiritual Exercises had adopted a less mystical 
interpretation of the application of senses, explaining it not as a higher form of prayer than the 
earlier meditations, but as a less demanding exercise suitable to the end of a long day of prayer.90 
Given that Jesuit education depends to so great an extent on the logic of the Exercises, such a 
change was bound to have broader repercussions. To this day, the temptation to resort to a more 
immanent and anthropocentric vision remains. Proposals, for example, which stress character 
building and leadership development above all enjoy broad popularity for much the same reason 
that humanistic education did.91 Since the 1970s, the growing consciousness of global economic 
inequality and human rights violations has raised the question of justice in a novel way. But 
                                               
88 As Hugo Rahner has noted, for Ignatius “[a]ll things which are not God are grasped, each in its inmost 
being, as something transparent, through which God shines forth.” Rahner, Ignatius the Theologian, 9. 
89 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modern World, ed. Joseph Fessio, Brian 
McNeil, and John Riches, vol. 5, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1983), 113. 
90 Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 1:368. 
91 Recent scholarship has sought to balance the overly rosy received view of humanism, arguing that it 
overtook scholasticism because it “fitted the needs of the new Europe that was taking shape, with its 
closed élites, hereditary offices and strenuous efforts to close off debate on vital political and social 
questions.” Anthony Grafton, From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in 
Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe (London: Duckworth, 1986), xiv. 
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nuanced efforts at an adequate response, such as that of Fr. Gen. Pedro Arrupe, have frequently 
been subject to superficial acts of appropriation which adopt the language of “men and women 
for others” without indicating its essential point of reference in the one man who acts “pro nobis” 
in the Bible and “for me” in the Exercises.92  
Even so, we are now in a better position than at any time since the early years of the 
Society to understand the originality of Jesuit education and to consult the founding vision for 
inspiration in our own day. Thanks to the Society’s ressourcement, set in motion by the 24th 
General Congregation (1892), we have a vast trove of documents from the founding era that 
provide vital glimpses of the emerging educational tradition. Perhaps as telling as the letter of 
Pierre Favre to the Jesuit students in Paris is one from Ignatius to Francis Borgia, who would 
eventually succeed him as the third superior general. Writing in 1545, Ignatius undertakes to 
console the devout duke by explaining what he has understood about how we come to sense God 
present in all things. “As I consider,” writes Ignatius, “how persons who go out of themselves 
and enter into their Creator and Lord possess a constant awareness, attention, and consolation, as 
well as a perception [sentir] of the way in which our entire eternal Good is present in all created 
things, giving existence to them all and preserving them therein by his own infinite being and 
presence, I readily believe that Your Lordship finds consolation in the greater number of them 
and in many others as well.”93 This is the vision of the final meditation of the Exercises and 
represents what Ignatius has understood about the ultimate happiness of man. Having been 
introduced into this exalted sense for God’s all-pervasive presence, the creature can find no 
greater gladness than the opportunity afforded him by this state to share in the mutual exchange 
                                               
92 Pedro Arrupe, “The Promotion of Justice and Education for Justice,” trans. Horacio de la Costa 
(Society of Jesus, August 1, 1973), http://www.sjweb.info/documents/education/arr_men_en.pdf. 
93 Ignatius Loyola, Letters and Instructions, ed. Martin E. Palmer, John W. Padberg, and John L. 
McCarthy S. J (Saint Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2006), 124–25. 
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of love. “For to persons who love God wholly, all things are a help and aid for meriting more and 
being more closely united by intense charity with their very Creator and Lord.”94 Remarkably, 
Ignatius refers to this state of being as a “school,” indicating the summit to which the whole of 
Jesuit education is oriented. “I strongly desire in our Lord,” he tells Borgia, “that inasmuch as he 
in his infinite and accustomed mercy is making Your Lordship too a scholar in this holy 
school…Your Lordship would labor and make every possible effort to recruit numerous fellow 
pupils.”95 Nor does Ignatius fail to make the link to the Society’s schools in the process. In fact, 
in answer to Borgia’s request to help him in the way he judged best, Ignatius asks that the duke 
“deign to assist me by assuming the administration and completion of a house or college that it is 
desired to set up there [in Gandía] for the scholars of this Society.”96 For Ignatius understood that 
it was the will of the Divine Majesty that the colleges of the Society and the school of living in 
God’s presence be one and the same. 
                                               
94 Loyola, 125. 
95 Loyola, 126. 
96 Loyola, 126. 
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Epilogue 
 
 
Education for Catholicity 
 
 
 
 
Those responsible for Catholic education have never been satisfied to understand it 
merely as education provided by Catholics or in an institutionally Catholic context. Rather they 
have insisted on pointing to a unifying element that gives it coherence, that makes of all its 
various pieces a genuine whole. Until the Land O’ Lakes meeting in 1967, “[s]cholastic 
philosophy retained its place as the linchpin of curricular integration” in the vast majority of 
Catholic colleges and universities in the United States.1 Buttressed by the revival of Thomism in 
the wake of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris in 1879, the Neoscholasticism of the 
universities privileged philosophy even over theology on account of the conviction that “most of 
the evils of the modern world, social and political as well as religious, took their origin from the 
misuse of human reason.”2 At the very end of this period, in 1953, a minor alternative tradition 
developed in response to the proposal of the great English Catholic historian Christopher 
Dawson that “the study of Christian culture” was uniquely capable of integrating the 
curriculum.3 Among all the phenomena studied in the university, culture “alone constitutes an 
intelligible field of historical study since no part of it can be properly understood except in 
relation to the whole,” Dawson explained.4 The long history of Western education showed some 
                                               
1 Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 164. 
2 Gleason, 108. 
3 Christopher Dawson, “Education and Christian Culture,” Commonweal 59 (December 4, 1953): 216. 
4 Dawson, 217. 
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understanding of this principle, but “for centuries higher education had been so identified with 
the study of one particular historic culture—that of ancient Greece and Rome—that there was no 
room left for anything else.”5 While having an essential relation to Greco-Roman antiquity, 
Dawson argued, Christian culture extends well beyond it. The true breadth of this culture had to 
be appreciated if Christian education was to survive now that the “old domination of classical 
humanism has passed away, and nothing has taken its place except the scientific specialisms 
which do not provide a complete intellectual education, but rather tend to disintegrate into 
technologies.”6 
 Both approaches were swept away by the gathering sense of crisis that finally came to a 
head in 1967. Already by the turn of the century, Harvard had removed Boston College and other 
Catholic institutions from a list of approved schools whose graduates could enter Harvard Law 
School without taking an entrance exam; and in 1901, the president of Notre Dame warned in a 
major speech to the Catholic Educational Association that “Catholic colleges were in the 
company of the nation’s most backward institutions of higher education.”7 Under immense 
pressure to modernize and to conform to the standard set by their secular peers, Catholic 
universities almost without exception opted for the approach articulated in the Land O’ Lakes 
statement, which privileged neither philosophy nor culture, nor indeed theology, but rather the 
model common to all modern institutions, modified only by the affirmation that theology still 
merited a place in the university. But without a clear sense of how theology was to be related to 
the work of the university as a whole, theology inevitably assumed the same status as any other 
discipline, thus depriving it of the power of integration. The decision came at a cost. Whatever 
                                               
5 Dawson, 216. 
6 Dawson, 217. 
7 Gleason, Contending with Modernity, 1995, 45. 
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personal synthesis individual students are able to effect for themselves or individual faculty 
members are able to promote in their classrooms, at the level of the institution as a whole 
Catholic education has come to mean little more than education provided by Catholics or in a 
Catholic context. 
 While the oldest and largest of Catholic universities in the United States still pursue the 
same essential strategy of Land O’ Lakes, deep dissatisfaction with this settlement is also evident 
some fifty years later, as is a desire to think once again about what makes an education Catholic. 
Reform efforts have taken a variety of institutional forms, ranging from the founding of new 
colleges to the development of new initiatives within existing institutions. Almost all of them, 
however, are marked by the same two approaches identified before Land O’ Lakes, taking either 
philosophy or culture to be the point of integration. Thus a new institution like Thomas Aquinas 
College offers a curriculum devoted exclusively to the study of the Great Books, integrated by 
the philosophical system of St. Thomas. Meanwhile the Catholic Studies Program at University 
of St. Thomas, together with the programs it has inspired at other institutions, provides interested 
students a supplementary curriculum focusing on great works of Christian culture from literature 
and history to art and architecture, philosophy and theology. Of the two approaches, it is the one 
founded on culture that seems especially in the ascendant, having sparked both more efforts at 
institution building and a larger body of literature. Such literature, moreover, makes clear that the 
two approaches represent strict alternatives. As one author puts it, “Catholic culture and history, 
not philosophy, should order the Catholic curriculum.”8 To these two prevailing approaches can 
                                               
8 Glenn W. Olsen, “Christopher Dawson and the Renewal of Catholic Education: The Proposal That 
Catholic Culture and History, Not Philosophy, Should Order the Catholic Curriculum,” Logos: A Journal 
of Catholic Thought and Culture 13, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 14. See also, e.g., Don J. Briel, “Looking 
Back at Newman,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 21, no. 3 (June 30, 2018): 21–34; 
Matthew Gerlach, ed., Renewal of Catholic Higher Education: Essays on Catholic Studies in Honor of 
Don J. Briel (University of Mary Press, 2017). 
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be added one more, which is based on the conviction that the Church itself, especially in its 
Magisterium, is what constitutes the integrating center of any education. While this same 
conviction is shared to some extent by institutions committed to the other two approaches, it is 
particularly evident in institutions like Franciscan University of Steubenville, the curriculum of 
which emphasizes neither philosophy nor culture so much as a general ecclesial orientation. 
 Each of these approaches offers some advantage or another over the Land O’ Lakes 
settlement, but none of them is finally capable of rendering an education catholic in the most 
profound sense of drawing all things into a genuine whole. With the aid of revelation, philosophy 
can trace, at least in broad outline, a general order of all things. But even in the face of merely 
finite being, the human intellect fails to comprehend the whole in anything other than the most 
abstract of ways; and when it comes to the question of existence and not merely essences, the 
intellect reaches an absolute wall. Why indeed does something exist rather than nothing? It is not 
enough to give the answer that God is existence itself. If there is such an absolute Being, the 
existence of finite being grows only more puzzling. In such a case, we would need to have 
reference to the divine will and not merely the intelligible order of things. Cultural approaches 
emphasize, with relative correctness, the salience of the will, though at least in the case of 
Nietzsche this advantage over philosophy is limited by his attention to the human will in place of 
the divine. The study of Christian culture, on the other hand, depends for its coherence at least 
implicitly on a fundamental reference to the divine will. It is the cooperation with this will by 
faithful people over time that gives rise to products of culture worthy of study, each of which 
provide some glimpse of a unity that lies beyond them in God. But precisely this pointing-
beyond-itself indicates that the whole is not to be found in culture. There is, therefore, a practical 
danger in proposing to treat Christian culture itself as the integrating center: that of mistakenly 
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identifying the whole either with the glories of an irretrievable past or with that which we 
ourselves can achieve in the present age.9  
 To the extent that they point beyond themselves, both philosophy and culture indicate 
where true catholicity lies, namely in God himself. It is the intimate relation to this fullness in 
God that makes the Church itself catholic, orienting it to a whole that lies beyond it and that 
vastly surpasses the limitations of its finitude. On this basis, some Catholic universities have 
thought it enough to invoke an “abstract ecclesial disposition” as the guarantee of an education’s 
catholicity.10 Indeed, as Balthasar notes, such a position is consistent with “the ordinary Catholic 
understanding, according to which the Magisterium provides a unity sufficient to gather up the 
multiplicity of dogmas to be believed.”11 While perhaps intuitive and well-intentioned, this 
position overlooks the fact that the Magisterium is not the source of its own unity. “The Church’s 
formal authority, like Christ’s, is ultimately credible,” explains Balthasar, “only as the 
manifestation of the majestic glory of divine love. But this gives it real credibility.”12 In other 
words, the fruit of the revelation of divine love is a deeper obedience to the Church, not on its 
own account but on account of the fullness of Christ’s life that radiates through it. Institutions, 
therefore, must do more than simply cultivate a fidelity to the Church. They must facilitate the 
cultivation in their members of the very disposition that is characteristic of the Church itself: 
                                               
9 Dawson, who is supremely well-balanced on this question, can nevertheless be given a voluntaristic 
reading on the basis of passages such as the following: “when we look back one hundred and twenty years 
and see what has been accomplished both in England and in America, we shall see that there is no real 
ground for pessimism. A new world of Catholicism has been created out of almost nothing. The 
achievement is greatest in the United States of America and it is in America that there seems the best 
prospect for the development of a Catholic culture, owing to greater material resources and to the 
existence of Catholic universities.” Dawson, “Education and Christian Culture,” 220. 
10 Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, 59. 
11 Balthasar, 147–48. 
12 Balthasar, 148. 
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catholicity. As Balthasar recalls, “Origen calls such a soul ‘anima ecclesiastica’: a soul with the 
dimensions of the Catholic Church.”13 
 How does one cultivate the disposition of catholicity? By contemplating the eternal Son, 
who receives all things from the Father and who reconciles the world to him. Education finds its 
integrating center here in the development of a profound theological aesthetic, which alone is 
capable not only of orienting the intellect to its infinite end but also of engaging the will in the 
divine drama that draws it beyond the narrow horizon of one’s own life. Paradoxically, it is just 
such a disposition that makes it possible for God to institute one in a particular form of life and 
to give one a specific and limited mission. The view of the whole gives the fragments their 
definitive meaning. Pope Francis never tires of returning to this point, which he learned from 
Ignatius Loyola: “This virtue of the large and small is magnanimity. Thanks to magnanimity, we 
can always look at the horizon from the position where we are. That means being able to do the 
little things of every day with a big heart open to God and to others. That means being able to 
appreciate the small things inside large horizons, those of the kingdom of God.”14 It remains an 
urgent task to specify how such a disposition, which formed the fundamental background of 
Jesuit education from the beginning, can be promoted in a concrete educational program for our 
own age. But this is a task that exceeds the scope of the present study. 
 At the end of John’s gospel, he recalls a time after the Resurrection of Jesus in which the 
disciples are unsure what to do. Having already encountered the risen Lord on several occasions, 
they are together back in Galilee unclear about what lies ahead. Growing restless, Peter decides 
to go fishing. He thus returns to an activity that is familiar and well within his power to 
                                               
13 Balthasar, In the Fullness of Faith, 81. 
14 Pope Francis, “A Big Heart Open to God,” ed. Antonio Spadaro, America 209, no. 8 (September 30, 
2013): 17. 
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accomplish, but also one redolent of his life prior to the definitive encounter with Christ. After 
fishing all night, Peter and the disciples who went with him have nothing to show for their labor. 
At precisely the moment when their frustration must have peaked, someone calls from the shore, 
asking whether they have caught anything. A terse reply: “No.” Cast your nets one more time, 
says the man. “So they cast it, and now they were not able to haul it in, for the quantity of fish.” 
(Jn 21:6) It is this overwhelming revelation of fullness that indicates to John that “[i]t is the 
Lord!” (21:7) Two more times in the narrative, he emphasizes that the net was “full of fish” 
(21:8), indeed “full of large fish” (21:11). And the most remarkable thing of all: “although there 
were so many [fish], the net was not torn.” (21:11)  
How frequently does the Church find itself in just such a moment. Frustration mounts as 
the night passes with nothing to show for so much labor. One need not have acute spiritual 
perception to detect traces of just such futility in contemporary Catholic higher education. But a 
contemplative gaze is indeed required to discern what the Lord is asking of the Church in this 
moment. Only such an eye for the catholic whole can see that, like the net full of large fish, even 
something quite small is capable of drawing all things into one. Nor is it likely to appear as great 
and impressive as the institution-building gambits that we have pursued for the past five decades. 
For in seeking wholeness in the only place it can be found, the one who contemplates the Son 
will inevitably become just as puzzling to the world as he is: 
The existence of the lover in time is…a mystery for the world, because his existence does 
not seem less fragmentary than any other; perhaps it seems even more fragmentary. For it 
makes no effort to form itself completely in time… What is given into his hands to 
administer is more than he can ascribe to himself: he can therefore only distribute it as 
something from elsewhere which has mysteriously come into his possession. Wholeness 
streams and shines through the fragments.15 
   
                                               
15 Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, 99, 101. 
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